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“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary 
giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the 
new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you 
of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome 
among us. You have no sovereignty where we 
gather.” 
 
- John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace”1 
 
 
Introduction 
 The widespread proliferation of information and communications technologies 
(ICT) over the past few decades has undoubtedly had profound impacts on innumerable 
facets of human life. The transformative effects that ICT use has had on social relations, 
international business, and global politics are in themselves remarkable, yet the speed 
with which they have occurred is at least equally impressive. Indeed, the so called 
“Internet revolution” has lived up to its moniker in so many ways that some leading 
media scholars argue that “immersion in the digital world is now or soon to be a 
requirement for successful participation in society.”2 Whether this modern requisite is 
ultimately for the better or worse, and if the associated changes have brought about more 
positive or negative effects, are subjects of much ongoing debate. Still, an overwhelming 
number of academics, politicians, and pundits believe modern ICT to be universally 
beneficial and staunchly advocate for accelerated global connectivity via the widespread 
adoption of such tools.  
 At the same time, a quieter and less publicized debate is emerging concerning 
who should direct the evolution of cyberspace (the notional environment created by 
                                                 
1
 John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” 8 February 1996, 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (accessed 23 February 2012). 
2
 John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, “The Internet‟s Unholy Marriage to Capitalism,” 
Monthly Review (March 2011): 1. 
 5 
5 
interconnected and interdependent ICT infrastructures, telecommunications networks, 
and computer processing systems) and who should govern the various activities that take 
place within. The explosion of e-commerce, cyber crime, and most recently the use of 
ICT in political and social movements, make this debate ever more pertinent. As such, 
countless actors from the private sector, governing agencies, and civil society have joined 
this conversation, each developing and advancing their own preferred plans for the future 
of ICT growth and governance. This thesis is a contribution to this ongoing discussion.  
While ICT includes a broad array of telecommunications systems, computers, 
hardware, software, etc, much of my analysis will be concerned with the Internet, as it 
constitutes what is arguably the greatest area of contention within the broader debate. 
Likewise, while this topic is of global import, this thesis will focus primarily on the US 
government‟s approach to international ICT governance (the US State Department‟s 
involvement with the subject in particular) and the role of US based ICT companies in 
promoting the adoption of ICT across the globe. The decision to narrow the focus was 
made for sake of brevity but also because of the US‟s prominent role in global cyber-
related matters. Beyond the typical clout it enjoys as the sole remaining superpower, the 
US has enormous influence over how global debates concerning cyber-issues unfold due 
to its position as the Internet‟s (and many ICT‟s) place of origin. Furthermore, the model 
of cyber infrastructure and governance that the US employs domestically and advances 
abroad is the most complete illustration of the “integration of monopoly-finance capital 
and the Internet, representing the dominant tendency of the global capitalist system.”3 
With such immense global influence over the issues of concern, the US is the ideal 
analytical focal point.  
                                                 
3
 Foster and McChesney 2011, 1.   
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 In the coming chapters, I will critically assess the US‟s “International Strategy 
for Cyberspace,” its policies concerning Internet freedom, and its corollary promotion of 
global connectivity via ICT. I will argue that the Internet freedom discourse constitutes a 
form of epistemic violence that the US government and its like-minded allies perpetrate 
against those who adhere to contradictory communication policies. I will further suggest 
that the associated policy initiatives render the US culpable, if not wholly responsible, for 
the physical violence that people may fall victim to as a result of using the technology it 
actively helps develop and promote. I also contend that the US‟s attempt to establish the 
guiding norms and govern the behavior in “cyberspace” is an example of “international 
governmentality,” a contemporary variant of Michel Foucault‟s notion concerning 
modern power relations. Following this, I will demonstrate how Foucault‟s understanding 
of governmentality reveals important aspects of the US-led cyber agenda that remain 
hidden in the rhetoric; aspects which allow for a more complete assessment of the policy 
and its implications.  
 
Chapter Overview 
In chapter one, I will define what I call the “Connectivity Doctrine;” a term meant 
to serve as shorthand for the (primarily) U.S.-led efforts to promote the proliferation of 
ICT use across the world and the global adoption of particular infrastructure models, as 
well as its desire to direct the evolution of cyberspace. The term also includes the 
argumentation, rhetoric, and relevant policies concerning “Internet freedom,” ICT 
development, and international cyber-governance. I will then include a discourse analysis 
 7 
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of the Connectivity Doctrine‟s major speeches and policies concerning the Internet in 
order to contextualize the parameters of the leading positions. 
In the second chapter, I will critically analyze the Connectivity Doctrine in an 
effort to reveal its underlying purposes as well as the potential implications, effects, and 
consequences it may have that are not explicitly articulated in the rhetoric. I will draw 
parallels between past and present variations of the “techno-optimism” discourse, 
situating the Connectivity Doctrine as a modern manifestation of a time-honored 
hegemonic strategy to maintain and expand power. I will argue that the same logic, 
rhetoric and methodology that was used by past hegemonic powers to justify imperialism 
in the 15
th
-20
th
 centuries is being used today to justify the contemporary, virtual 
“colonization” of cyberspace.  
Once the Connectivity Doctrine has been defined, dissected, and contextualized, I 
will shift the focus of my thesis to theory. I will present Michel Foucault‟s study of 
neoliberal governmentality as a theoretical framework which can be used to explain what, 
how and why specific actors advance certain organizational designs and policy 
recommendations concerning how the Internet should evolve and how it ought to be 
governed. I will provide a brief, but necessary overview of Foucault‟s theory in chapter 
three, followed by two chapters in which I apply governmentality theory to the 
Connectivity Doctrine to illustrate its broad implications. Finally, I will conclude my 
thesis by arguing that the Connectivity Doctrine is part of a larger project of neo-liberal 
globalization; a project that has historically fostered the overthrow of governments, 
military invasions, and otherwise represents a form of subjugation disguised as 
 8 
8 
benevolence that can lead to various forms of state violence and ultimately, modern 
Empire.  
 9 
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Chapter I: The Connectivity Doctrine
4
 
 The use of the Internet, social networking sites, mobile devices, and other ICT in 
recent social and political movements has reinvigorated a long-established spirit of 
“techno-utopianism” that had seemingly been dormant since the “dot-com bubble” burst 
in the 1990s. Such optimism has been a historically reoccurring trend that tends to 
emerge whenever new technology is developed, especially technology that has the 
potential to transform both the market and social spheres. It is important to note that the 
promise of new technology is almost always predicated on economic and material 
improvements first; the potential social benefits  (efficient global communication, greater 
access to knowledge, the strengthening civil society by fostering democratic debate, etc.) 
are typically addressed later, as the discourse evolves.  While both rationales are 
important, the economic impact must be great enough to influence market behavior as 
well as policy makers before the potential social benefits are integrated into the rhetoric. 
In the present case, ICT has opened up countless new markets and has thus gained 
the interest of both capital and political nodes of power. Many contemporary cyber-
optimists,
5
 in turn, have hypothesized about the potential social benefits modern ICT may 
have and believe that global connectivity via ICT represents the solution to many of the 
world‟s problems. To cite just a few examples, cyber-optimists argue that ICT 
(particularly the Internet) has brought about a new wave of citizen journalism; that it 
                                                 
4
 The term, “Connectivity Doctrine,” is my expanded take on what Evgeny Morozov calls the “Google 
Doctrine.” While the terms are similar in that both refer to the “enthusiastic belief in the liberating power 
of technology” (Morozov 2011, xiii), the “Google Doctrine” focuses primarily on US governmental 
partnerships with Silicon Valley on foreign policy matters. The “Connectivity Doctrine” takes this as a 
point of departure and expands it to include the US-led effort to shape the Internet‟s architecture globally 
and establish behavioral and governmental norms in cyberspace. The term also borrows from Julian 
Reid‟s outstanding analysis of the “biopolitics of information technology” and the subjectification of “the 
Connected” and “the Disconnected” as new categories of human beings (Reid 2009). 
5
 This term and its variants refer to the virtually messianic belief in the “emancipatory nature” of ICT 
coupled with a “stubborn refusal to acknowledge its downsides.” (Morozov 2011). 
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fosters a new sense of collective identity and community among users;
6
 and that it will 
provide people with unprecedented resources, information and power. They point to the 
reduced costs of democratic participation, ease of communication, increased access to 
information, and expedited social mobilization as examples of how ICT have been used 
to promote political engagement. Furthermore, cyber-enthusiasts contend that modern 
ICT made possible novel modes of activism such as cyber disobedience, virtual protest, 
and hacktivism,
7
 which are better suited for contemporary social and political 
movements. As such, those subscribing to these beliefs advocate for the proliferation of 
ICT to increase global connectivity, arguing that doing so will help quell existing power 
imbalances and decrease inequality across the globe. Like-minded politicians and policy 
makers in turn adopt this line of argumentation and include ICT in development plans 
and international aid packages. Taken together, the academic research, the political 
rhetoric, and the promotion of specific policies comprise the theoretical basis and driving 
force of the Connectivity Doctrine. 
Still, the Connectivity Doctrine is more than a collection of position papers and 
policies. While these are important components that help illustrate its principles, the 
Doctrine is fundamentally a philosophical view that guides the pertinent research and 
informs the related policies. Similar to the “Bush Doctrine” 8 and the “Monroe 
                                                 
6
 Saeid Golkar, “Liberation or Suppression Technologies? The Internet, the Green Movement and the 
Regime in Iran,” International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society vol. 9, no.1 (2011): 51. 
7
 Ibid., 52. 
8
 The “Bush Doctrine” is a phrase used by politicians and pundits to describe the guiding ideology and 
policies of the George W. Bush Administration that were initially outlined by President Bush in his 
speeches following the attacks on September 11, 2001 and later developed throughout his term in office. 
Never presented as an official or comprehensive document, the Bush Doctrine was a set of principles that 
informed policy decisions; core among them, the right to subject any state or organization that it deemed 
a potential threat to the United States to the “full range of instruments of power,” including economic, 
diplomatic, and military means (most notably the right to wage unilateral and pre-emptive war).  
 11 
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Doctrine,”9 the Connectivity Doctrine is not a formal document or official policy ratified 
by congressional legislation, but is instead a phrase that refers to various principles and 
ideologies that help shape foreign and domestic policy. It is strongly influenced by cyber-
utopianism in that it is a “quasi-religious belief in the power of the Internet to do 
supernatural things.”10 As we will explore further, such a techno-centric approach to 
foreign policy often replaces more effectual political action in a way similar to how the 
Bush Doctrine‟s emphasis on unilateralism often left no room for more traditional 
diplomacy and compromise.      
The Connectivity Doctrine is similar to other Western-engineered development 
plans in both its initiation and deployment. Setting aside the potential merits of the 
arguments, the agenda, like most modern development plans, assumes a market-based 
understanding of improvement and progress, one that demands infinite growth potential 
and is assessed primarily by quantitative measurements. Also similar to other modern 
development plans, it is experts and academics from NGOs, think tanks, and academia 
who establish boundaries, define units of measurement and assessment, and generate 
models for achieving “progress” and “success.” Likewise, politicians and policy makers 
translate these action plans into official policy and then try to convince the broader public 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chambers Dictionary of World History, 2005, s.v. “Bush Doctrine,” 
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy1.lib.depaul.edu/entry/chambdictwh/bush_doctrine (accessed 23 
February 2012). Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations, 2002, s.v. “Bush Doctrine,” 
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy1.lib.depaul.edu/entry/abcintrel/bush_doctrine_2001 (accessed 
23 February 2012).  
9
 Likewise, the Monroe Doctrine, which expressed the US‟s neutrality in European Affairs and condemned 
all future acts of European colonialism in the Americas, was never ratified by congress, but rather existed 
as a set of principles and beliefs that guided official policy and decision making. First expressed by 
President Monroe in a speech to congress, the Doctrine evolved over time in response to US foreign 
policy priorities. The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2008, s.v. “Monroe Doctrine,” 
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy1.lib.depaul.edu/entry/columency/monroe_doctrine (accessed 23 
February 2012).  
10
 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 
2011), 19.  
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of their worth.  The rhetoric used often presents these policies as politically neutral and 
uncontroversial, and as specific terminology gets repeated and policies approved, ideas 
and discourses become normalized and gradually gain widespread public acceptance. In 
this way, “idea producers” and governmental agents work together to manufacture 
“universal knowledge.”   
The United States has a pronounced interest in expanding global connectivity as 
well as shaping the governing architecture of cyberspace. As the base of many of the 
largest technology companies, the US economy stands to gain tremendously from 
increased sales of its products and services abroad. The US government also has a 
strategic interest in global connectivity, as its evolution has immeasurable implications 
for national security, international relations, military engagements, and countless other 
arenas. Thus, understandably, the US private and public sectors each try to take 
advantage of the techno-optimism discourse and promulgate the assertion that modern 
ICT use serves as the best and most efficient path toward global economic development 
and societal progress.  
Beyond increasing sales of US based ICT products and services, the Unites States 
government further seeks to establish and institutionalize guiding principles and norms of 
behavior to govern cyberspace. To advance this goal, it positions itself as the natural 
leader in shaping, codifying, and administering Internet governance. The US argues that 
as the birthplace of many ICT and the home of many of the preeminent experts on the 
subject, it is uniquely qualified for this role. In the International arena, the US has been 
successful in influencing the evolution of cyber-governance largely by exercising the 
aforementioned strategy of creating “universal knowledge” through directing the terms 
 13 
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and conditions of relevant discussions. It strategically situates global connectivity and 
“Internet freedom” as part of broader human rights and development discourses; a clever 
political maneuver that makes the issues appear politically and value neutral. As we will 
see, this is not always the case. While arguing that it is simply advancing universal rights 
and norms, the “Connectivity Doctrine” implicitly privileges Western, neo-liberal 
conceptions and ideologies concerning property rights, freedom, governance, economics, 
and world view.  
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1.1 The Connectivity Doctrine as Articulated in  
US State Department Speeches 
The Obama administration has been clear since taking office that cyberspace is 
central to its foreign policy. Among other things, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has 
given several highly publicized speeches concerning the United States‟ Internet freedom 
agenda; the State Department‟s “NetFreedom Taskforce” has been notably active; and in 
May of 2011, the White House released the official “International Strategy for 
Cyberspace,” the first of it kind.11 Despite these speeches and documents, the term 
“Internet freedom” remains rather ambiguous; likewise, what its promotion entails and 
what the benefits and costs associated with this endeavor might include remain unclear. 
Still, careful analysis of the relevant speeches and policy documents helps clarify some of 
these ambiguities.  
In January 2010, just days after Google announced it would no longer comply 
with the Chinese government‟s demand for the company to censor web searches in the 
country, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a speech to a group of politicians, 
NGO representatives, and leaders from the telecommunications industry that laid out the 
Obama administration‟s Internet freedom policy.12 In February of the following year, just 
days after the Egyptian government shut down the entire country‟s access to the Internet 
in response to growing demonstrations, Secretary Clinton made another speech, titled 
“Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked World, that further 
                                                 
11
 In the introduction to the document, President Obama writes: “this is the first time that our nation has laid 
out an approach that unifies our engagement with international partners on the full range of cyber issues.” 
Executive Office of the President and the National Security Council (U.S.). “International Strategy for 
Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World.” May 2011. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf 
(accessed 29 April 2012). 
12
 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” Speech, The Newseum, Washington D.C., 21 January 
2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm, (accessed 2 April 2011).  
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articulated the US‟s position and policy. Beyond simply advocating for an open internet 
that allows for free speech and fosters democratic dialogue, the text of these speeches (as 
well as the strategic timing of their delivery) offers insight into how communication 
technology can help advance the US‟s broader ideological, technological, political, 
economic and geo-strategic goals. To help unpack these ideas, I will first provide a brief 
overview of the US‟s position on Internet freedom, as defined in Clinton‟s speeches. 
Following this, I will review the US‟ International Strategy for Cyberspace in an effort to 
further clarify the US‟ position and related policy. In subsequent chapters, I will dissect 
some of the deeper implications this policy may have concerning foreign intervention, 
surveillance, and violence. 
Without using the words explicitly, Clinton begins both of her speeches by 
framing the issue of Internet freedom as one of “good” vs. “evil.” She warns that 
communication and information technologies can just as easily be used to foster 
economic progress and social justice as they can to undermine them. As such, she argues 
that it is essential for the US to promote network designs and policies that advance 
liberal-democratic values while at the same time increasing the number of people who 
have access to the Internet.
13
  
Clinton acknowledges that the Internet‟s architecture can be constructed in 
numerous ways; ranging from a severely restricted Internet, such as the Chinese model, 
where governments have the authority to monitor and censor the content that individual 
users view, to a radically free and lawless model, akin to what the Internet‟s originators 
had in mind, and everything in between. Clinton recognizes that the world‟s information 
                                                 
13
 Clinton 2010, 2. (Note: the transcripts of Clinton‟s speeches are not numbered. For ease of reference, any 
page numbers listed in footnotes are my own, based on a copy of the transcript printed directly from the 
cited url) 
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infrastructure being built today will have profound and long-lasting effects on global 
power configurations of the future. This being the case, she contends that the United 
States‟ design can “deliver the greatest possible benefits to the world”14 and should thus 
serve as the model for other countries to emulate. Further arguing the supremacy of the 
American model, Clinton charges that countries with alternative Internet policies,
15
 such 
as those with aggressive surveillance and censorship practices, are “taking the wrong 
path” and that their misguided approach will ultimately fail.16  
Still, an Internet that simply reflects liberal-democratic values by embracing 
Western interpretations of free speech and market-driven content production and 
dissemination, yet remains fragmented along national borders in terms of access and 
governance is not adequate, according to Clinton. Reaching further, she states that the 
ideal network architecture would be a singular, global Internet that is accessible to “all of 
humanity.”17 Defending this point, she argues that this particular version of the Internet 
can serve as both “the great equalizer” and “the on-ramp to modernity,”18 as it allows for 
the expedited exchange of information and enable capital to spread to new markets more 
efficiently.   
Secretary Clinton also explains how the US has committed diplomatic, financial, 
and technological resources to promote its preferred form of the Internet and the liberal-
democratic values embedded within. The US has used various diplomatic channels to 
                                                 
14
 Hillary Clinton, “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked World,” Speech, 
George Washington University, Washington D.C., 15 February 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm, 2, (accessed 2 April 2011). 
15
 Clinton is specifically referring to governments that restrict citizen access to the Internet in the name of 
security or public morality.  
16
 Clinton 2011, “Internet Rights and Wrongs,” 4. 
17
 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” Speech, The Newseum, Washington D.C., 21 January 
2010, 3, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (accessed 2 April 2011). 
18
 Clinton, 2010, 5. 
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help associate Internet freedom with human rights on a global level, including placing the 
issue on the agenda of the United Nations Human Rights Council.
19
 Financially, the State 
Department provides funding for individuals, companies and institutions that develop 
global information and communications technologies that “advance [their] diplomatic 
and development objective.”20 And technologically, the US helps create and deploy 
software that enable foreign citizens to circumvent their home government‟s censorship 
and surveillance practices and provides training on how to use them.
21
  
Clinton infuses Western interpretations of human rights, modernity, and progress 
in her rhetoric to justify the US‟s Internet policy. Of these, she spends the most time 
arguing that that Internet freedom should be regarded as a basic human right. Clinton 
contends that certain individual rights (now among them the right to have unfettered 
access to information and communicate via a free and open Internet) are universal and 
calls for a global commitment to protect these rights. Her references to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights‟ inclusion of the right to exchange information seems to 
support international agreement on these issues, yet she also refers to a particularly 
American experience with and understanding of rights. For instance, Clinton argues that 
the right to speech should never be restricted, yet concedes that this freedom has 
limitations, such as restrictions on libel and slander as well as provisions to protect 
intellectual property. Highlighting the distinctly American, liberal interpreation of free 
speech for which she advocates, Clinton notes that she disagrees with legal restrictions on 
hate speech, presumably including many European countries‟ laws against holocaust 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., 7. 
20
 Ibid., 8. 
21
 Ibid., 7. 
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denial.
22
 Clinton further contends that governmental processes should be made 
transparent, but maintains that governments have the final say in what information is 
appropriate for public consumption and what should remain confidential.
23
  
Beyond the human rights frame, Clinton furthers her claim that the US model 
works to the benefit of all by highlighting its ability to stimulate economic growth and 
foster liberal democratic principles. In this way, the US‟s Internet policy is promoted as 
an act of benevolence; the diplomatic efforts, financial investments, and acts of 
technological intervention are all aimed at “improving the lives” of the global population 
and providing the “foundation for global progress.”24 Calling the Internet “the great 
equalizer,” she argues that modern communication networks can help integrate more 
people into the global market economy and will “create new opportunities where none 
exist.”25 Clinton then makes an allusion to the primacy of Western enlightenment 
philosophy as she argues that the US‟s efforts will also promote greater respect for 
diverse views and help strengthen democratic principles. She asserts that access to 
information and reasoned discourse alone can nullify intolerance and offensive speech; 
by merely exposing different ideas to debate, she contends, “those with merit [will be] 
strengthened, while weak and false ideas [will] fade away.”26  
Finally, Clinton argues that the US has a responsibility to shape the architecture of 
a single, global Internet and establish international “norms of behavior” concerning the 
                                                 
22
 Clinton 2011, 6. 
23
 Clinton uses WikiLeaks as an example here, arguing that the ensuing debate over government 
confidentiality was a “false debate” because the U.S. could “neither provide for our citizens‟ security nor 
promote the cause of human rights and democracy around the world if we had to make public every step 
of our efforts” (Clinton 2011, 5). 
24
 Clinton 2010, 9. 
25
 Ibid., 5. 
26
 Ibid.,  6. 
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“global networked commons.”27 She traces this responsibility back to the nation‟s 
founding commitment to the free exchange of ideas,
28
 yet more recent factors are also 
pertinent. Clinton maintains that because it is the birthplace of many communication 
technologies, the United States has a responsibility to ensure that they are used for good. 
To do this, the US must synchronize “technological progress with [its] principles”29 by 
using diplomatic mechanisms to establish guiding rules and norms for communication 
networks, by providing funding to promote connectivity, and through technological 
intervention, technological or otherwise, when necessary.   
 
1.2 The United States’ “International Strategy for Cyberspace” 
In May 2011, the Obama Administration released the US‟ first ever 
comprehensive agenda concerning global ICT titled: [The] International Strategy for 
Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World. This document is 
the clearest articulation of the Connectivity Doctrine to date, and alongside Secretary 
Clinton‟s speeches, serves as its ideological basis. As such, these texts will serve as the 
anchor around which I will situate my analysis.  
Released several months after she initially introduced the US‟s position on cyber 
issues, the International Strategy for Cyberspace reinforces the principles Secretary 
Clinton had outlined previously in her speeches. The Strategy maintains the three main 
priorities of economic prosperity, security, and the promotion of universal rights, and 
uses these to justify its strategic approach. It also expands on the US‟s role in directing 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid.,  3. 
29
 Ibid. 
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the future shape of cyberspace and its governance structures. In a highlighted section of 
the document, the policy‟s overarching goal is clearly articulated:30  
 
“The United States will work internationally to promote an open, 
interoperable, secure, and reliable information and communications 
infrastructure that supports international trade and commerce, strengthens 
international security, and fosters free expression and innovation. To 
achieve that goal, we will build and sustain an environment in which 
norms of responsible behavior  guide states‟ actions, sustain 
partnerships, and support the rule of law in cyberspace.”31 
 
 For present purposes, it should be noted that the economic objective is listed first, 
followed by security, with free expression coming last. Furthermore, while this 
highlighted section suggests that the US will “work internationally,” the second sentence 
states matter-of-factly, “…we will build” [with we referring to the US and perhaps like-
minded states] an environment in which norms of responsible behavior guide state 
actions. Also intriguing is that establishing and formalizing “norms of responsible 
behavior” is not only stated explicitly, but is actually written in bold typeface to 
emphasize the importance of this particular goal.  
What constitutes responsible behavioral norms, and who defines them as such, 
reveals an extremely important power dynamic that lies at the core of the Connectivity 
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Doctrine, yet is often hidden in the rhetoric. Assuming responsibility over the 
construction of the cyber-environment, the US becomes the de facto party that determines 
what constitutes said “responsible” norms of behavior; however, the strategy document 
does state that the US will work with “like minded states” to establish these norms.32 In 
its explicit pronouncement of this role, the document extends the model of hegemonic 
power demonstrated in other US foreign policy strategies to the cyber realm. Such bold 
declarations concerning global leadership roles perpetuates the implicit belief in the 
supremacy and global applicability of Western norms and values, which are to be 
integrated into the architecture of cyberspace. Still, the document goes on to argue that 
these norms are not new, but rather are extensions of the already-existing norms that 
guide international relations, the “rules that promote order and peace, advance basic 
human dignity, and promote freedom in economic competition.”33  
At present “cyberspace” has no universally accepted or codified norms, and its 
governance structure remains in its infancy. As such, the US Strategy suggests five 
principles that “provide a basic roadmap” to guide how states‟ policies concerning the 
Internet: fundamental freedoms should be upheld; intellectual property rights must be 
respected and protected; individual privacy should be valued as a priority; states should 
cooperate in international cybercrime investigations; and finally, states should enjoy the 
right to self-defense against “aggressive acts in cyberspace”34 
 In order to achieve its policy objectives, and “help promulgate positive norms,”35 
the US strategy combines diplomatic, defensive, and developmental initiatives. The US 
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asserts that the benefits of connectivity are universal, and thus remains committed to 
“ensuring others benefit from our technical resources and expertise.”36 Diplomatically, 
the policy states that the US will “create incentives” for other states and private actors to 
embrace the stated behavioral norms and guiding principles.
37
 And in terms of 
development, it will continue to provide the “knowledge and capacity” to build and/or 
support new and existing digital networks around the world.
38
  
 The defensive portion of the strategy is especially interesting as it highlights the 
importance and novelty of cyberspace as a focus of international relations and a new front 
for modern warfare. The strategy is clear that the US “reserve[s] the right to use all 
necessary means-diplomatic, informational, military, and economic- as appropriate…to 
defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.”39 This sentiment echoes 
that of U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Lynn III, who wrote in an article for 
Foreign Affairs
40
 (subsequently published on the U.S. Department of Defense‟s 
website
41) that “as a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace 
as a new domain in warefare…[one that is] just as critical to military operations as land, 
sea, air, and space.”42 
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Chapter II: Analysis of the Connectivity Doctrine 
Before analyzing the Connectivity Doctrine through the Foucauldian lens of 
governmentality, it is worthwhile to examine some of its rhetoric, claims, policies and 
inconsistencies in greater detail. In the following section I will situate the contemporary 
Doctrine as part of a long evolving “techno-utopian” discourse. I will then examine the 
role of trusteeship and claims to authority within the Doctrine. Finally, I will highlight 
some of the logical, intellectual, and practical inconsistencies within the rhetoric and 
policies associated with the Connectivity Doctrine.  
 
2.1 Cyber-Utopianism and Techno-Optimism:  
Historic and Present Variations  
From the printing press to the Blackberry, technological advances have long 
inspired optimistic conjectures about the potential impacts they might have on society. 
These have often been welcomed as harbingers of human progress and are given 
immense credit for societal improvement. At the same time, there has also been a 
concurrent discourse of techno-pessimism that rejects such optimistic assertions. 
Prometheus and Frankenstein along with modern concerns about atomic energy and the 
“singularity43,” are all part of this long history of criticism that warns of the dangers of 
“playing god” through technological advances.  
Despite this debate‟s long history, both discourses continue to make their 
arguments for or against the adoption of new technology. These arguments remain 
largely the same as their historic variations, altered only as necessary to address the 
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technology-du jour. True to form, and with perhaps more fervor than ever before, techno-
enthusiasts are now making broad claims about the transformative, empowering, and 
democratic effects the Internet and other information and communications technologies 
(ICT) may have on individuals and societies the world over. Such claims are not 
necessarily without merit, as technology has undoubtedly had a tremendous effect on 
human society throughout history. However, the historic record is riddled with examples 
of times when the techno-optimism discourse has failed to deliver on many of its 
promises.   
In the fifteenth century, the printing press revolutionized the production and 
dissemination of information, which many credit with making possible the Renaissance, 
the Protestant Reformation, the scientific revolution, and the birth of modern democracy. 
In the nineteenth century, the electrical telegraph ushered in a new era of global 
communication and international relations along with promises of unprecedented world 
peace.
44
 Likewise, many heralded the advent of the “flying machine” in the twentieth 
century as a technological achievement that would “erase international boundaries 
associated with nations, languages, and money” and subsequently bring about a 
“brotherhood of man.”45 
These romantic accounts of technology‟s contribution to human progress are often 
as misleading as the techno-enthusiasts‟ promises. They all too easily overlook the 
potentially negative consequences of so-called “liberation technology”46 and instead, 
overemphasize the positive effects of these tools. Keeping with the previous examples for 
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instance, the printing press certainly made it simpler to spread information to mass 
audiences, but it also facilitated increased state control over populations via the 
production of more effective propaganda and gave rise to more robust practices of 
censorship. Similarly, the use of the telegraph (and its succeeding technologies) and the 
development of aeronautics allowed for unprecedented communication and travel, yet 
their use in warfare contributed to the bloodiest century in human history.
47
 Such 
consequences are generally accepted as justifiable (albethey negative) externalities, as the 
social benefits are argued to exceed any unfavorable effects. Thus, even while 
acknowledging that all technology comes with potentially deleterious repercussions, its 
advocates persistently promote advances in ICT as being universally beneficial.  
In recent years, the benefits of new technology have often been framed in terms of 
economic opportunities or democratic empowerment. In the1980s, it was Xerox 
machines, VCRs and fax machines that were supposed to (and later romantically credited 
with) toppling communism and usher in liberal-democratic regimes, one reproduction at a 
time. Likewise, the Internet was marketed to the US consumer population as an 
egalitarian and liberatory technology when it first became publicly available in the 
1990s.
48
 Accounts from the Internet‟s early years hypothesized that it would 
revolutionize all existing institutions; communication systems would be democratized, 
corporations would be forced to act more responsibly, governments would become more 
transparent, and there would be a global renaissance in education.
49
  
                                                 
47
 Diamond 2010, 71. 
48
 I will elaborate further in subsequent chapters. 
49
 Foster and McChesney 2011, 2. 
 26 
26 
While the dreams of the 1990s never fully came to fruition,
50
 the same promises 
and arguments are being made today as ICT and connectivity are promoted globally as 
universally beneficial in both the economic and political realms alike. Again, the 
potentially harmful effects are readily acknowledged (identity theft, unauthorized 
surveillance, decreased privacy, etc.), they simply are downplayed as the acceptable risks 
of an otherwise positive technology.  
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2.2 Technology, Knowledge, and Power 
Of course there is some truth to the positive assertions made concerning 
technology; each innovation was indeed employed as a means to achieve some users‟ 
desired ends. Still, technology and knowledge are far from being neutral products or 
concepts. Each has deep rooted ideological, political, and economic imperatives that 
influence their development. What is often missing from the techno-optimism discourse 
(besides the negative externalities) is a discussion regarding the intimate connection 
between power and knowledge production and management.  
Michel Foucault argues that the basic premise of power is knowledge, and that 
through appropriating and (re)producing knowledge, modern power thereby reproduces 
and strengthens itself.
51
 As such, agents of hegemonic power have long been concerned 
with the production and management of both knowledge and technology. These interests 
are separate but complimentary, as technology has long played an integral role in the 
production, delivery, and consumption of knowledge. And as technology advances, 
power adapts accordingly, incorporating it into its „truth‟ manufacturing and 
dissemination processes.  
Modern hegemonic power networks
52
 privilege and promote the forms of 
knowledge and technology that ensure their continuity. Technology is systematically 
employed to produce, code, and order knowledge in such a manner so that its recipients 
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accept it and internalize it as truth, reproduce it, and redistribute it. While the actors have 
changed, this process is not all that different from the methods employed by Western 
Imperial powers in their attempts to colonize new territories (this will be examined 
further in subsequent chapters).  
 
2.3 Strategic use of History in Techno-Optimism Rhetoric 
Like their techno-utopian-minded predecessors, modern cyber-enthusiasts often 
conjure up sanitized versions of history to support their optimistic stance. The most 
common historical references made by Western advocates of the Connectivity Doctrine 
have to do with the Cold War and the (arguably overemphasized) role fax machines, 
Xerox machines, and VCRs played in toppling the Soviet Empire. Secretary Clinton 
recently made such an allusion in her 2010 speech on Internet freedom, warning that a 
new “information curtain” is beginning to divide the world and that in response, “viral 
videos and blog posts are becoming the samizdat
53
 of our day.”54 Similarly, Senator 
Arlen Specter argued that the U.S. should find ways to help foreign nationals breech the 
firewalls erected by their governments because “tearing down these walls can have the 
same effect of what happened when the Berlin Wall was torn down.”55 Many other 
politicians and pundits from within and outside the United States are also quick to draw 
parallels from the Cold War.
56
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There are several problems with drawing such parallels: they are historically 
inaccurate; they oversimplify complex issues; and they can result in severely misguided 
policy initiatives. Touching on the first issue, while rhetorically appealing, the Internet is 
extremely different than technologies that were widely used in the 1980s. Fax machines 
and photocopiers certainly simplified the proliferation of samizdat literature, but the risk 
was minimal, as was (arguably) their utility.  Unlike 1980s-era technology, the Internet 
can serve an infinite number of purposes and harbors far more risk for those who use it to 
challenge oppressive regimes. For example, the Internet can just as easily be used as a 
surveillance mechanism or a carrier of propaganda as it can be to organize 
demonstrations or pass along oppositional information.
57
 And unlike Xeroxed 
reproductions, information published online can often be easily and quickly traced back 
to its point of origin. 
While historic parallels and metaphors can be rhetorically appealing, they tend to 
oversimplify issues and leave critical factors not included in the metaphor left 
unexamined, thus “creat[ing] the illusion of complete intellectual mastery of an issue.”58 
They often emphasize certain aspects of an issue to make a point, while ignoring other 
aspects that do not fit the intended abstraction. Furthermore, theoretical devices like these 
frequently have the effect of implicitly suggesting solutions based on their own referent, 
even if these solutions are not explicitly stated. These (perhaps) unintended consequences 
can have profound implications on how policymakers understand and respond to a given 
situation. In the present case, the metaphor suggests that, similar to the Berlin Wall and 
the Iron Curtain, firewalls simply need to be destroyed or circumvented and democracy 
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will inevitably and peacefully follow. What is left out is that physical walls are much 
more expensive and require far more time and manpower to erect than virtual walls. Such 
misguided optimism creates an “illusory sense of finality and irreversibility”59 that can be 
as seductive as it is dangerous. Focusing only on technological ease, this line of 
argumentation ignores the sociopolitical nature of the issue and neglects the enormous 
risks involved.  
 
2.4 Unique qualities of modern ICT and the 
Connectivity Doctrine’s Contradictory Nature  
There are certainly similarities between the spread of ICT and the adoption of past 
technologies. However, there are several characteristics of modern technology that make 
it truly revolutionary
60
 and unlike anything that came before. One noteworthy example is 
that cyber-technologies are the fastest diffusing communication technology in history
61
 
and have facilitated the “democratization of communication” to a degree few other 
technologies have achieved.
62
 Furthermore, although they are the consequence of all 
technological systems, the socio-political ramifications of modern ICT are especially 
pronounced due to their necessary interactions with and influences on the multifaceted 
processes of globalization. Countless actors simultaneously help shape and are shaped by 
their interactions within cyberspace on a daily basis, making it a constantly evolving 
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domain, rather than a static artifact or tool, like the copy machine, fax machine, or 
VCR.
63
 
The unique qualities of modern ICT makes it especially difficult to regulate and 
govern. This difficulty is especially evident in the US-led attempt to institutionalize 
universal rules and norms and behavior for cyberspace. As a consequence, obvious 
inconsistencies are present in the Connectivity Doctrine in terms of its theory and 
application.  
One of the more troublesome inconsistencies lies in how the Doctrine subjects 
Internet freedom to liberal notions of governmental sovereignty. The Doctrine also has 
trouble defining what it means by “Internet freedom.” The Doctrine embraces broad 
rights for private corporations to restrict access to content in the name of “intellectual 
property,” while at the same time cautioning against governmental restrictions of Internet 
content. Likewise, it argues that while on the one hand, WikiLeaks threatened the 
security of people around the world, governments should still strive for maximum 
transparency.  
The Doctrine is also unclear on the extent of governmental sovereignty and state 
rights. It seemingly wants to have it both ways; it promotes a free and open Internet that 
is assessable to all, but also maintains that the government has the final say in what 
material should be kept confidential. While it may be reasonable for a regime that rules 
with its people‟s consent to assume a limited right to keep certain information secret in 
order to protect its citizens, the Connectivity Doctrine offers a very biased understanding 
of what is included in this protection. For instance, restricting access to material that is 
culturally offensive or otherwise runs counter to prevailing dominant values is not 
                                                 
63
 Ibid., 45. 
 32 
32 
included in this limited, yet ambiguous, definition. Restrictions resulting from concerns 
over morality (such as access to pornographic material) or potentially harmful content 
(such as hate speech) are deemed illegitimate by the Doctrine‟s reasoning. Thus, although 
confusing, the Doctrine seems to argue that states have the right to determine what is 
appropriate for public consumption, but only if their final determination coincides with 
the US‟s view. 
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Chapter III: Theoretical Framework: Biopolitics and Governmentality 
 Now that the Connectivity Doctrine has been defined, dissected, and historically 
contextualized, I will shift the focus to theory to determine how Michel Foucault‟s 
understanding of Governmentality might augment our understanding of its underlying 
goals and implications. I will first provide a brief overview of the theory‟s major tenets 
before demonstrating how it applies to the present study. 
 
3.1 Governmentality: A Brief Overview 
Foucault‟s work on governmentality came at the end of his short, but prolific 
career. While touching on the subject in his earlier work, Foucault did not fully explore 
the notion of governmentality until his lectures at the College de France in the years 
immediately preceding his death. Admired by many devotees who praise his theories and 
criticized by an equally fervent camp of scholars who dismiss his philosophy for various 
reasons, Foucault has long been one of the most oft-cited theorists of all time.
64
 Still, the 
recently published transcriptions
65
 of his final lectures have brought about another 
resurgence of interest in his work. What is striking about this recent wave of intrigue is 
how much his final lectures have changed scholarly opinion about Foucault‟s philosophy. 
Rather than being referenced as a “thinker of power,” as he was in the 1980s and 1990s 
when his name was virtually synonymous with the term, Foucault is increasingly 
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becoming regarded as a “thinker of subjectivity.”66 This shift in viewpoint of the scholar 
reflects the theoretical revisions Foucault made to his earlier work during his lectures on 
governmentality. Foucault introduced the notion of governmentality as a “necessary 
critique” of his previous conceptions of power; 67 the concept addresses some of the 
limitations of his earlier work and presents a novel understanding of modern power 
relations in Western societies.
68
  
One of the most dramatic differences between Foucault‟s earlier work and his 
analysis of governmentality is his shift in understanding of power. In his later work, 
Foucault stresses that modern power is principally about guidance and “structuring and 
shaping the field of possible action of subjects.”69 Consensus and coercion remain 
relevant, but are reformulated as “means of government;” “they are „elements‟ or 
„instruments‟ rather than the foundation or source of power relations.”70  
Here Foucault makes a shift in his understanding of power and domination, terms 
that he previously used interchangeably. In a theoretical improvement on his earlier work, 
Foucault now carefully differentiates between power and domination. He explains that 
domination is a particular, asymmetrical type of power relationship, in which the 
subordinated individuals and groups have an extremely limited margin of freedom.
71
 As 
an alternative to power-as-domination, Foucault introduces the theoretical notion of 
power relations as “strategic games between liberties,” which seek to structure the field 
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of possible actions and guide the behaviors of individuals who ultimately decide their 
own course of action.
72
 
This marks another radical theoretical shift in Foucault‟s thinking. Foucault‟s 
earlier studies on the analytics of power focused on the impact of disciplinary processes 
on “docile bodies” in the formation of subjects.73 Many prominent scholars (including 
Jurgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser, Charles Taylor, etc.) criticize this interpretation of 
subjectivity for being “monolithic relativism,” citing its neglect to recognize individual 
agency and the potential for resistance.
74
 In response, Foucault makes clear in his later 
work that “an analytics of government demands the recognition of the „other‟ as the 
subject of action” and that “power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar 
as they are „free.‟”75 He further concedes that individuals do have autonomous agency 
that allows them to “transform themselves in order to attain a certain desired state.”76  
Now viewing power as a relationship, rather than simply domination, Foucault 
introduces the notion of government to analyze the connections between “technologies of 
domination” and what he now calls “technologies of the self.”77 In other words, 
“governors” still attempt to guide the behaviors of individuals, but individuals remain 
free to conduct themselves as they please. In contrast to power-as-domination, Foucault 
explains that “governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor 
wants,” instead, “it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts 
between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is 
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constructed or modified by himself.”78 Likewise, the “techniques of government” do not 
forcibly or directly shape the actions of individual or collective actors, but instead set the 
conditions of possible actions.
79
  
 Foucault defines “government” as “the set of institutions and practices, from 
administration to education, through which people‟s conduct is guided.”80 More 
concisely, governmentality is simply, “the conduct of human conduct.”81 As direct as this 
definition is, its simplicity is deceptive. Semantically linking the act of „governing‟ 
(„gouverner‟) and „modes of thought‟ („mentalité‟),82 governmentality is presented as a 
modern manifestation of power that seeks to “shape human conduct by calculated 
means.” 83 The simplified definition expresses this by playing on numerous senses of the 
word „conduct.‟ ‘To conduct’ refers to leadership, in that an actor is directing or guiding 
another how best to carry out a task. A reference to a particular understanding of morality 
or value system is implied when the word is used as a reflexive verb, ‘to conduct 
oneself;’ alluding to certain forms of behavior that are deemed appropriate in specific 
situations. A related sense of the word, the noun ‘conduct,’ is also used to define an 
individual‟s actions or behaviors, again with the supposition that there exist agreed upon 
modes of (appropriate) conduct.
84
   
Usages of the various terms are almost invariably normative and evaluative. They 
presume standards or norms of behavior that serve as the ideal by which individual 
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conduct can be assessed.
85
 And in almost all cases, a notion of guidance or regulation is 
inferred; a presumption that not only is it possible to direct behavior, but also that agents 
exist whose responsibility it is to ensure this control occurs.
86
 Combining the various 
senses of the word „conduct‟ and their associated presumptions, Mitchell Dean puts forth 
the following, expanded definition of government:  
 
Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, 
undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a 
variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape 
conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and 
beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a 
diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and 
outcomes.
87
   
 
 This definition exhibits the novelty of Foucault‟s analytics of government and 
demonstrates how governmentality employs, but remains distinct from, sovereign and 
disciplinary power. The classic understanding of sovereign power is concerned primarily 
with securing and expanding the territorial reach of the sovereign’s realm. The sovereign 
has absolute authority to issue edicts, punish enemies, and determine who will live or 
die.
88
 In contrast, the focus of governmentality is not on territory or riches, but rather on 
the population it governs. The art of governance requires the governing body to receive 
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authorization to exercise authority.
89
 Rather than “wreak[ing] havoc with 
impunity…violence must be justified by a notion of improvement. Its purpose cannot be 
mere plunder or domination.”90  
Likewise, Foucault‟s understanding of governmentality is distinct from 
disciplinary power. While disciplinary power seeks to establish order (in specific groups 
of people or things) via “technologies of domination” such as detailed supervision, laws 
and/or punitive measures, the purpose of government is to protect the welfare of a given 
population and improve its overall condition.
91
 Whether this means decreasing 
unemployment, providing better healthcare, improving education, or increasing access to 
information and communication technology, the focus is not on the individual, (as it is in 
disciplinary institutions such as prisons, asylums, and schools) but rather on the 
population as a whole.  Disciplinary power alone is insufficient for such lofty aims. At 
such a grand level, physical coercion and training of each individual is impossible, as is 
the detailed regulation of their actions. Instead, governmental techniques operate by 
“educating desires and configuring [the] habits, aspirations and beliefs” of a given 
population.
92
 Instead of brute coercion or ubiquitous regulation, conditions are artificially 
set in such a manner that individuals may not necessarily be aware that their conduct is 
being conducted; rather, “people, following their own self interest, will do as they 
ought.”93 
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Foucault explains that there are two related but distinct sides of governmentality 
(both reviewed above), one dealing with the rationalization of exercising power and the 
construction of specific forms of intervention and the other dealing with processes of 
subjectification. The first allows those governing to define “problems” that need to be 
addressed by identifying and demarcating the pertinent concepts, objects, and borders of 
assessment. The second refers to the codependent nature of governmental institutions and 
autonomous, individual actors.
94
 While Foucault‟s analytics of government focus on 
power relationships between the modern sovereign state and a domestic population, 
NGOs, international political and economic institutions, and other governing agencies use 
the same governmental techniques in their various policies and development projects to 
guide the behaviors of individuals throughout the world.  
Demonstrating this point in her work on developmental programs in Indonesia, 
The Will to Improve, Tanya Murray Li examines the means by which outside “experts” 
are able to diagnose problems, develop solutions to solve said “problems,” and otherwise 
intervene in communities of which they are not a part. These experts and other external 
participants act as “trustees,” a role that she explains is “defined by the claim to know 
how others should live, to know what is best for them [and] to know what they need.”95 
While Li‟s focus is on the various attempts to “improve the lives” of people in Indonesia 
through targeted reform, her underlying logic applies perfectly to the Connectivity 
Doctrine‟s proposed goal of global improvement and progress via connectivity. 
 As a governmental stratagem, trusteeship requires some degree of approval 
before policies are enacted. An NGO, for instance, cannot implement a development plan 
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in a country by forceful coercion alone. It must, instead, appeal for public consent 
directly or otherwise set conditions by which to ensure official endorsement of their plan. 
This is not to imply any nefarious intentions; on the contrary, the trustees‟ objective is not 
typically to dominate others, but rather to “develop the capacities of another,” “enhance 
their capacity for action, and to direct it.”96 Their intentions are thus often altruistic, 
desiring nothing more than to “make the world a better place.” Whatever their proposed 
course of action for solving the identified problems may be, it is believed to be for the 
betterment of the common good – the health of the population at large, the stimulation of 
economic growth, the fostering of democratic values, etc. And the solutions often appear 
commonsensical, as the “natural expression of the everyday interactions of individuals 
and groups.” 97 Still, regardless of the altruistic intentions that often drive these plans, 
“the claim to expertise in optimizing the lives of others is a claim to power, one the 
merits careful scrutiny.”98 
 
3.2 Governmentality, Biopolitics, and Liberalism 
Governmentality, as a “technology of security” employed for the “regulatory 
control of a population” developed in large part as the modern nation-state‟s response to 
the unique properties of classical liberalism. First developed in 17
th
 century Britain, this 
political ideology rejected the idea of absolute monarchy and the Divine Right of Kings, 
and instead embraced individual rights, minimal government, and a free-market 
economic system. The role of government, according to this view, was limited to 
protecting the populace from foreign aggressors and providing public services and 
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institutions that were not profitable when managed within the private sector. The 
challenges posed by this system, which in many ways represented a new and innovative 
“art of governance” in its own right and threatened the very purpose of the state, 
necessitated a drastic adaptation of the role and function of governmental power.  
More than simply an economic theory or a political ideology, liberalism emerged 
as a unique system of governing human beings, with the new epistemic figure of the 
population as its target and political economy as its principal form of knowledge.
99
 
Governmentality thus adopted certain liberal rationalities to guide state power. As 
divinely ordained power was no longer deemed legitimate, laws now had to be enacted in 
accordance to a newly defined “natural order” based on the market‟s principles of 
efficiency and self-regulation. Similarly, “economic reasoning” was to assess the merits 
and usefulness of governmental action; rather than physical domination and disciplinary 
control, the focus was shifted to creating spaces for market expansion.
100
  
The neo-liberal reforms enacted by numerous countries over the past few decades 
clearly demonstrate the success and global extension of Foucault‟s notion of 
governmentality. By redefining the social sphere as part of the economic realm, neo-
liberal regimes have been able to develop “indirect techniques for leading and controlling 
individuals” while at the same time redirecting social risks such as illness, 
unemployment, poverty, etc. into the domain of individual responsibility.
101
  The 
effectiveness of this epistemological shift is clearly illustrated in the contemporary 
understanding of homo oeconomicus, or the rational-economic individual, which is now 
defined by an artificially arranged, yet purportedly instinctual entrepreneurial and 
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competitive behavior.
102
 In this way, assuming responsibility for matters and problems 
that had previously been the domain of state agencies has become a bizarre “reward” for 
those who accept that this “liberty” is a gift.103  
The widespread adoption of neo-liberalism marks a fundamental shift in the 
modern state‟s raison d‟etre; rather than territorial expansion, the market is now its 
“organizing and regulative principle.”104 The fundamental task of the modern liberal-
democratic state is to “universalize competition and invent market-shaped systems of 
action for individuals, groups and institutions.”105 What were previously sacrosanct, 
“extra-economic domains are now rendered „economic‟ and are colonized by criteria of 
economic efficiency.”106 In keeping with this fundamental task, the Connectivity 
Doctrine employs governmental techniques in order to integrate market ideology into the 
Internet‟s architecture in a manner that presents liberal norms and values as “natural” and 
inevitable. In this way, the Doctrine conditions Internet users‟ behaviors in such a way 
that market logic is internalized and reflected in their virtual actions. In other words, 
Internet users‟ conduct is being conducted, even if they are unaware this is the case.  
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Chapter IV:   
Governmentality and the Internet or  
The Conduct of Cyber Conduct 
 Despite the rhetorical promotion of freedom, empowerment and progress, the 
seemingly innocuous Connectivity Doctrine takes on an entirely different meaning (with 
much broader implications) when viewed through the lens of governmentality; after all, 
“to govern the Internet is to govern people.”107 By applying the “analytics of 
government” to the Doctrine, a more calculated political strategy begins to unfold, one 
whose ultimate aim reaches far beyond simply „freedom,‟ as its proponents suggest.  
 The United States has positioned itself as the leader of Internet freedom and for 
all intents and purposes, represents the embodiment of the Connectivity Doctrine. As 
such, the U.S. stands as the key agent seeking to “conduct the conduct” of individuals in 
cyberspace,
108
 and its official speeches and policies can be regarded as instruments or 
techniques of governmentality. That said, cyberspace is not a typical territory with fixed 
borders, and its “inhabitants” do not meet the standard definition of “citizen.” Rather, the 
sovereignty of cyberspace remains highly contested and activities that occur therein often 
have dramatic effects in the “real world.” Thus, when US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton states that the U.S.‟s Internet freedom policy is “about what kind of world we 
want…a planet with one Internet, one global community, and a common body of 
knowledge,”109 she is implicitly suggesting that the U.S.‟s agenda is not only concerned 
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with influencing cyber governance, but is ultimately concerned with shaping the structure 
of the physical world and guiding the behaviors of its inhabitants.  
As defined by Foucault, government is typically concerned with improving the 
welfare of a domestic population (by increasing the GDP, lowering infant mortality rates, 
improving education, etc.). However, the population of interest does not necessarily need 
to be comprised of citizens of a particular state. Instead, Secretary Clinton alludes to 
governance that extends to a global population of the Connected, one that uses 
biopolitical power to work through a singular “global community”110 in order to deliver 
“the greatest possible benefits to the world.”111 The population of concern here are not 
Americans (or its allies, or its enemies for that matter), but rather “all of humanity.”112 
An integral characteristic of Foucault‟s understanding of governmentality is the 
ability of those governing to exact influence over human conduct without the individual‟s 
explicit knowledge or consent. This is done not through direct force, but rather by 
“setting conditions to encourage people to behave as they ought.”113 Individuals may not 
know they are being “conducted,” and instead believe they are acting in their own self-
interest. 
 In shaping the architecture of the Internet, the Connectivity Doctrine sets virtual 
conditions in a manner that encourages users to internalize certain norms and values as 
uncontested, natural, neutral and/or inevitable. Its proponents thus ensure that an 
increasingly expanding connected global population conforms to their preferred version 
of liberal ideology. Users become connected seemingly of their own free will, responding 
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to the many advertised benefits of connectivity: instantaneous communication, increased 
access to information, low-cost entry into a global marketplace, business efficiency, etc. 
Still, in becoming connected (in the dominant, Western sense), users tacitly accept a set 
of behavioral norms and values that are set by those seeking to shape and govern 
cyberspace.  
As more and more individuals become connected, cyberspace‟s „population‟ 
grows, and with it the pool of „governable‟ subjects. The U.S. and other advocates of the 
Connectivity Doctrine are likewise concerned with the general welfare of the connected 
population; they believe their technical expertise and purported moral superiority leave 
them responsible for instituting the proper regulations that will improve the wellbeing of 
the Connected. Thus the Connectivity Doctrine (as discourse) insists that there is a 
“singular valid shape for the network‟s architecture” and that this sole version represents 
“the peoples‟ interests.”114 Again, this appeal to users for their approval is where 
governmentality differs from sovereign power.  Sovereign power would simply demand 
compliance and obedience. Instead, modern power networks employ governmental 
techniques to convince a globally diverse, connected population that its policies serve 
their greater interests and likewise set the conditions in such a manner that individuals 
choose to become connected.  
The improvement of a population writ large constitutes the central purpose of 
liberal government and explains the motivation of those seeking to influence the 
architecture of cyberspace. Nevertheless, how this is done (without physical coercion) 
requires further clarification. To „conduct the conduct‟ of an individual assumes that the 
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one being governed is a capable political actor and therefore, a “locus of freedom.”115 It 
likewise assumes the possibility that the governed are capable of thinking and behaving 
differently than desired. Liberal modes of government work through this freedom and try 
to shape it,
 116
 conceiving it as a “technical means of securing the ends of government.”117 
Rather than denying the individual actor her freedom, liberal rationalities “attempt to 
define the nature, source, effects and possible utility of these capacities of acting and 
thinking.”118  
 
4.1 Cyber Governmentality Via “Human Rights” 
By situating the Connectivity Doctrine within the broader Human Rights 
discourse, the US depoliticizes the highly contested nature of technology and the cultural 
and symbolic understandings thereof. The very formulation of Internet freedom as a 
fundamental human right is universalistic in nature and serves as an extension of 
Western, hegemonic discourse. Likewise, the Connectivity Doctrine‟s model of Internet 
freedom is largely premised on the US‟s understanding of free speech. As such, 
unrestricted access to the Internet is the ideal norm and any sort of censorship or 
restricted access is seen as an illegitimate claim to power and an affront to human rights.  
Such a liberal definition of free speech is problematic if for no other reason than it 
is a distinctly US definition. Several states have limits on speech, including several US 
allies. Many European countries, for instance, have laws against holocaust denial, and 
have made it illegal to publish websites that espouse such claims. According to the 
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Connectivity Doctrine, however, individuals and groups should be free to present their 
views online and these sites should be freely accessible to all; no country should limit 
their production.  
Likewise, the US, and many of its allies, view pornography as a commodity that 
can be bought and sold (provided all relevant parties are consenting adults). With such a 
substantial role in shaping its content, the Connectivity Doctrine leaves no room for states 
to censor pornographic material on religious or cultural grounds; rather, individual users 
should be free to choose whether or not to view such content. While a more thorough 
examination of this point is beyond the purview of this paper, for present purposes it is 
sufficient to note that the Connectivity Doctrine‟s position of Human Rights, Free 
Speech, and Internet Freedom are all premised on particular understandings of the terms 
and are not necessarily universally applicable or valid.  
The Doctrine‟s identification of a particular network architecture as the harbinger 
of [Western-defined] universal human rights trumps competing norms of communal 
rights, self-determination, or national sovereignty.
119
 As Daniel McCarthy of the Centre 
for International Studies and Diplomacy at the University of London argues, this line of 
argumentation is an example of the US‟s larger post-Cold War attempt to alter the 
international understanding of sovereignty. Claiming a monopoly on “authoritative 
knowledge,” the US advances a catchall definition of sovereignty, which deems states 
that do not adhere to modern, liberal norms
120
 as not properly sovereign.
121
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While the Connectivity Doctrine is often framed as being part of a broader 
Human Rights discourse, the issues are far greater than simply “individual freedom” or 
“universal rights.” Furthermore, its policy implications go well beyond basic domestic, 
foreign, or even cyber realms. The Connectivity Doctrine is ultimately concerned with 
shaping the structure of the world and guiding the behaviors of its inhabitants. Clinton is 
surprisingly upfront about the political, economic and ideological agendas that the 
Doctrine serves. She readily admits that “no country more than America stands to 
benefit” from what a globally free Internet can offer, and that information technology can 
absolutely “help advance [the US and its allies‟] diplomatic and development 
objectives.”122 To this point Clinton adds: “it‟s about what kind of world we want…a 
planet with one Internet, one global community, and a common body of knowledge.”123  
In this vein, the US seeks to control the terms of the debate over the correct 
architecture of the Internet and its governance so that its position appears to be the only 
rational and logical possibility. The Connectivity Doctrine‟s core arguments are framed 
as though they are the results of a “pre-given technological rationality” rather than the 
outcome of a politically contested process. The success of such argumentation is 
achieved by means of “technological closure,” through which targeted problems 
seemingly disappear as new technological norms become increasingly internalized within 
a society as natural and uncontroversial until they eventually become routine and taken 
for granted.
 124
   
In the case of information and communication technology for instance, 
proponents of the Connectivity Doctrine first identify authoritarian, non-liberal states 
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with contradictory ICT policies as problematic. Such states are subsequently labeled 
illegitimate and criticized for not being in line with the interests of their population 
(interests which are often conveniently defined by the same hegemonic powers that 
embrace the Doctrine). The Connectivity Doctrine is then presented as the best solution 
to solve the perceived deficits and the model that can serve the needs of the problematic 
states‟ population more effectively than those offered by non-liberal states. Those 
advocating for this particular, singular global Internet architecture thus identify both the 
problem and the solution while at the same time imbibing ICT with symbolic meaning. In 
this way, they can establish the legitimacy of their claims by highlighting examples of 
connectivity‟s success, without addressing the more contentious aspects of the Doctrine. 
Any misgivings concerning the proposed “solution” become secondary issues, as the 
“success” helps establish the technological artifact as an accepted part of the social 
environment.
125
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Chapter V: The Biopolitics of Connectivity
126
 
 In 1997, as the Internet was still just beginning to gain mass popularity, journalist 
Jon Katz wrote an article for Wired magazine about the emergence of a new kind of 
people he called “the Connected.” These were not simply tech-savvy individuals who 
used the Internet, but rather constituted a distinct category of people with unique 
characteristics who could be identified and studied as a whole. The Connected, he argues, 
are “knowledgeable, tolerant…[p]rofoundly optimistic about the future…[and] convinced 
that technology is a force for good.”127  They also tend to favor a free-market economic 
system, which they believe to be a powerful engine of progress.
128
 
Katz was referring specifically to the birth of „the Connected‟ in the U.S., yet the 
rapid proliferation of information and communication technologies (ICT) has caused a 
global surge in this new category of people, and with it, a resurgence of techno-
utopianism. Among the leading academics touting the liberatory potential of connectivity 
are Manuel Castells, the world‟s foremost-cited communications scholar, and James 
Rosenau, former president of the International Studies Association. Both agree that the 
Connected constitute a new type of socius that may represent the very “transformation of 
sociability itself.”129 Rosenau further argues that the Connected are more skilled, more 
competent, and more imaginative than any other historical social formation.
130
 
These scholars, and those that share their opinion, contend that this revolutionary 
change in humanity also initiated a “major transformation of the global structures that 
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govern world affairs.” 131 Cyber-utopians argue that this process is transforming “existing 
institutions and practices of state sovereignty into something more benign and beneficent 
to human life on a global scale.”132 Connectivity is seen here as something organic and 
natural, the “outcome of a historical process of gradual increases in the evolutionary 
powers of the human species.”133 
It is important to note here, again, that within the cyber-utopian argument, 
information technologies are assumed to be politically neutral. However, connectivity is 
not an inevitable evolutionary step, but is rather a potential evolutionary capacity that 
ICT can foster, provided certain conditions are met. What this means is that the “advance 
of the Connected” depends on the “securing of strategic conditions in which the 
Connected can be constituted.”134 Therein lies the political dimension of connectivity, as 
liberal governments seek to secure said conditions, they are inevitably acting in 
accordance with an ideological agenda. Liberal regimes, through modern technologies of 
government and security (political actions), “configure habits” and “set conditions” to 
ensure people “do as they ought,”135 i.e., become part of the Connected.  
Foucault explains that the modern liberal project embodies a unique “faith in its 
ability to correlate the political development of humanity with a knowledge of its 
biological properties and capacities.” Likewise, its success has depended on “strategies to 
promote those tendencies and habits within governed populations which accord with the 
„biological destiny of the species.‟”136 As such, if connectivity is understood to be an 
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“evolutionary capacity” that requires certain prerequisites be met before it can develop, 
liberal governmentality is concerned with promoting those tendencies and habits that 
ensure these conditions are met.  
This further demonstrates how ICT are far from neutral tools, but are instead 
highly political “technologies of security” which liberal regimes employ to promote the 
“optimal and proper functioning of the economic, vital, and social processes” of a given 
population.
137
 Furthermore, technology is never merely a tool; rather, “[its use] is a way 
of enframing the human as a thing that both uses and can be made use of.”138 In the case 
of connectivity, subjects must be taught how to be connective. Connective habits must be 
instilled so that individuals can be subjected to the “lore of connectivity.”139 This is why 
ICT proliferation is so central to the Connectivity Doctrine. Information has become the 
hegemonic organizational code, thus there is great interest in controlling information (or 
at least regulating how it is produced, disseminated, and received). As Julian Reid notes, 
“[i]n embracing information politically, we subject ourselves to a biopoliticized account 
of connectivity. We become informatic subjects, performing the works of a global 
political order in which the very problem of order – and the problem of your and my 
place in it – is conceived in informational terms.”140  
Guided by liberal rationalities, connected regimes benefit from the expansion of 
the Connected population, and thus have a vested interest in “converting” those who 
remain disconnected. As such, the Connectivity Doctrine‟s rhetoric is often highly 
optimistic, promising unparalleled personal and societal improvement, or else the benefits 
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of connectivity are simply assumed and presented as obvious. This is an example of what 
Foucault terms “mentalities of government;” a term which refers to governmental 
practices that become embedded in language or are otherwise taken for granted. Such 
mentalities are not usually subject to debate and are simply accepted as authoritative.
141
 
This governmental technique allows for the production of “truth,” which can be used to 
condition and direct the conduct of a population.
142
 
In a demonstration of just how effective these mentalities of government have 
been in neutralizing the issue, connectivity has now become a metric by which 
international institutions, academics, and others evaluate the well-being of human life 
throughout the world. To remain disconnected is interpreted as being at best primitive 
(lacking the capacities to become connected), or at worst threatening. Similarly, 
connectivity has become analogous with freedom and progress, thus imbuing the issue 
with both moral and security implications. Morally, the Connected feel obliged to 
shepherd the Disconnected into modernity so they too can reap its rewards. As a security 
issue, “disconnectedness defines danger” to the Connected, as it is within this population 
where they are likely to find “instability” and “threats to the functioning of the 
international system and the global economy.”143 As such, rather than being a “natural 
evolutionary capacity,” connectivity is a security project hinging on the subjection of 
humanity to the Connectivity Doctrine. And like all security projects, it is a violent one, 
for the Connected must resort to force whenever it encounters people who are hostile to 
its Doctrine.
144
 As former advisor to the US Secretary of Defense, Thomas P.M. Barnett 
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writes: “Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a 
supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will.”145 Whichever 
the case, “disconnected peoples must be made into connected ones.”146 
 
5.1 Connectivity and Capitalism  
 The Internet has certainly had transformative effects in countless arenas, still it 
has failed to deliver on many of its champions‟ more ambitious promises, particularly 
those having to do with its ability to precipitate social equality or economic prosperity. 
This is not to say that the Internet is devoid of liberatory potential. Quite the contrary, this 
cyber network, still in its infancy,
147
 continues to possess extraordinary democratic and 
revolutionary promise. However, technologies do not exist in a vacuum; rather, “they are 
developed in a social, political, and economic context.” 148 These factors have absolutely 
shaped the course of the so-called „digital revolution‟ and their influence remains ever-
present in the Connectivity Doctrine.  
The historic and contextual development of the Internet highlights its paradoxical 
existence. Contrary to the prevailing logic, the Internet has not always been a haven for 
individualism, and capitalist entrepreneurialism. Rather, this particular field of digital 
communication was developed almost entirely through government subsidized and 
directed research. Indeed, had it been left to the private sector, “the Internet never would 
have come into existence.”149 Still, although it was created as a free and open public 
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sphere, separate from the world of commodity exchange, the Internet quickly became 
subjected to the processes of capital accumulation, as its maintenance and access 
increasingly became the purview of private corporations. As a result, the Internet has 
evolved into a virtual private sphere of “increasingly closed, proprietary, even 
monopolistic markets.”150 Such markets have logics of their own, which are all too 
frequently inimical to democratic practices. Ironically, the very structure of the Internet 
runs counter to market logic. And as such, there are inherent problems with allowing the 
profit motive to dictate its development;
151
 weaknesses that help explain why the 
Connectivity Doctrine has failed to deliver on some of its promises. 
 As an intangible, virtual network, the Internet has always had awkward footing 
within a market system based on supply and demand. The main reason for this is that the 
Internet is neither a scarce resource nor a consumable commodity, but is rather a medium 
by which users can communicate with others and/or access information. Therein lies the 
fundamental problem: in economic terms, the Internet and its content are considered 
“non-rivalrous and non-exclusionary” given that “[one] person‟s use of information, 
unlike tangible goods and services, does not prohibit others from using it.” 152 For this 
reason, media products have long posed problems for capitalist systems and have 
historically required market interventions for them to operate within its framework.
153
 
Keeping in step, intervention was required in order to introduce the Internet to the public 
as a billable good within the free-market system.    
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In order to commodify the Internet, service providers (ISPs) had to create scarcity 
artificially, largely by controlling and charging for access. In the US, the giant 
telecommunication corporations became the gatekeepers of the Internet by default 
because they already had what amounts to government-issued monopoly licenses over 
telephone and cable television wires. Fortuitously, the Internet became publicly available 
at the very time that the government (responding to pressure from the powerful telecom 
lobby) was easing regulations of the telecommunication industry. With such strong 
commercial and political power behind them, U.S. telephone and cable television firms 
established an Internet access industry that was (and remains) the antithesis of free-
market capitalism. In 2011, for instance, 78 percent of U.S. households had at most two 
options for wired broadband access. This amounts to an effective duopoly; an 
uncompetitive market form in which it is in both firms‟ self-interest to charge extremely 
high prices and where neither firm has any real incentive to improve their service.
154
 
This model is certainly not ideal, and other countries have adopted alternative, 
and oftentimes more efficient, means of providing Internet access. In fact, it is worth 
noting that the U.S. ranks between fifteen and twenty in terms of global broadband 
access, quality of service, and cost.
155
 Such statistics help illustrate the difficulties in 
aligning the Internet to market logic and cast doubts on the U.S.‟s position as the example 
of how the Internet should be governed.   
Beyond charging for access, private companies are further commercializing the 
Internet via Internet-related industries (such as search engines, email, social media, 
mobile applications, etc.), in many cases generating incredible market concentration. 
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Many ICT companies are seizing enormous profits by establishing virtual monopolies 
with global reach. Google, for example, commands between 70-90 percent of the global 
search engine market and Apple‟s iTunes controls an estimated 87 percent of the digital 
music market and 70 percent of the MP3 player market.
156
 Microsoft, Intel, Amazon, 
Facebook and others enjoy similar monopolistic power in their respective markets as 
well.
157
  
Such examples run directly counter to the Connectivity Doctrine‟s projection of 
the Internet as a free-market utopia and a facilitator of competition and consumer 
empowerment.
158
 Moreover, by design, networked markets like the Internet actually 
accelerate market concentration and encourage monopolies by a process called 
“Metcalfe‟s law,” which states that the value of a network increases in proportion to the 
square of its connections. Correspondingly, consumer attraction to a particular firm 
increases by an order of magnitude as it gains an increased share of the market. This is 
especially true for companies like Google and Facebook, whose service actually 
improves with each new user. Such market tendencies make competition nearly 
impossible as the largest companies quickly expand and drown out all competitors. 
159
  
 
                                                 
156
 Adam L. Penenberg, The Evolution of Amazon, Fast Company 137 (July/August 2009): 66-72. 
157
 McChesney 2007, 8  
158
 Ibid. 
159
 Ibid., 9-10.  
 58 
58 
Chapter VI: Connectivity, Violence, and Empire 
 In their influential book, Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri present a 
definitively postmodern and theoretical notion of „Empire‟ to address the modern 
political order of globalization. The motivations, goals, and characteristics of modern 
Empire, as articulated by Hardt and Negri, are seemingly quite similar to those of the 
Connectivity Doctrine. As such, a brief overview of their theory may prove helpful in 
working through the Connectivity Doctrine‟s guiding logic. 
Hardt and Negri contend that modern Empire honors no territorial limits and 
instead seeks to rule over a spatial totality that constitutes the “civilized world.” Empire 
also effectively “suspends history,” thereby removing all temporal boundaries that might 
suggest a yet-to-be alternative. Borrowing Foucault‟s notion of biopower, Hardt and 
Negri further argue that Empire not only manages populations and contructs the world in 
which they live, but ultimately tries to rule over the social sphere in its entirety. Finally, 
no matter how violent its actions may be, peace consistently remains at the center of 
Empire‟s rhetoric.160   
Despite similarities in the terms, this novel conception is significantly different 
than the traditional understanding of imperialism, which they, in agreement with Eric 
Hobsbawm, believe to be a project that has long since died and is no longer manageable 
in the modern age. In the absence of the center-periphery power dichotomy on which 
Western Imperialism was premised, modern power now flows through networks. As 
such, in the present case, proponents of the Connectivity Doctrine strategically navigate 
these power networks in an effort to influence the production, coding, ordering, and 
dissemination of knowledge via ICT.  
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In its present form, Empire is guided by a liberal, capitalist-based market logic; 
thus its goals mirror those of the US and its allies. It is therefore understandable that 
proponents of the Connectivity Doctrine have adopted many of the aforementioned 
characteristics of Empire to advance their mutual aims. Likewise, the Doctrine‟s 
adherent‟s employ epistemic violence as a means to systematically “suspend history,” 
and “remove special and temporal boundaries” in order to “manage [virtual] populations 
and construct the world in which they live.” Peace and tolerance remain central themes of 
the Connectivity Doctrine‟s rhetoric, despite the epistemic violence that silences and 
condemns alternative viewpoints. 
 
6.1 Epistemic Violence 
Such bold claims to authoritative knowledge like those presented in the 
Connectivity Doctrine are examples of epistemic violence being carried out on 
“subjugated knowledges” that are not analogous with hegemonic discourses. As Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak explains in her influential inquiry into the Western intellectual‟s role 
in power relations, “Can the Subaltern Speak,” epistemic violence establishes a particular 
explanation of reality as normative and uncontestable. In the process, it disqualifies 
contradictory claims to knowledge as “inadequate to their task,” “insufficiently 
elaborated,” “naïve,” or “beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity.”161 As 
with other forms of imperial violence, epistemic violence is often justified as necessary to 
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protect “the other” from her “own kind” and to establish “good society”162 in places held 
back by inferior knowledges, norms, and values.  
By situating their goals within a broader commitment to political and civil rights, 
advocates of the Connectivity Doctrine advance a particular type of technology that 
accords with a Western understanding of liberal-democratic norms and values.
163
 Such a 
strategy is part of the larger goal of expanding liberal, democratic capitalism 
internationally; “Internet freedom” is but one of many vehicles employed to advance this 
goal.
164
 These norms and values, however, have contested political and economic aspects 
that do not always coincide with the freedom rhetoric or the rights discourse. 
For one example, while the US argues that everyone should in principle have 
access to information, the ability to access that information is not guaranteed. Thus a 
strictly political and liberal definition of equality is implied even when the benefits are 
said to be universal.
165
 The US is thereby able to maintain its commitment to intellectual 
property rights, whose profits would be threatened by the extension of substantive 
equality of access, without explicitly discussing this point.
166
 In using the limited, 
political definition of equality, the US is able to quietly weave liberal-economic values 
into the human rights discourse without having to explicitly defend the merits of doing 
so. Similar to “adding pork” to congressional legislation, this strategic method ensures 
that the debate is kept to a minimum. Any challenge to the inclusion of these symbolic 
values can be dismissed as an affront to human rights and thus unworthy of debate.  
                                                 
162
 Ibid., 298-299. 
163
 McCarthy 2011, 97. 
164
 Ibid., 98. 
165
 Ibid. 
166
 Ibid.  
 61 
61 
Because the terms of the debate have been so effectively demarcated, the 
questions that academics, NGOs, and international governing institutions ask often fall 
neatly within the established perimeters. These inquiries typically involve how to close 
the digital divide, how information technology can be used to improve economic 
conditions, and how best to regulate information traffic flows. The debate is primarily 
concerned with how ICT affects populations (in terms of its economic output, education, 
democratic participation, etc); rarely does the debate include what impact connectivity 
has on users as individuals.  
Addressing this point, Julian Reid argues that the act of becoming connected 
subjectifies peoples, constituting them as members of a group distinguished by the 
properties of connectivity.
167
 “The Connected,” as a subset of people, are increasingly  
understood to be more social, more competent, and more skilled, than “the 
Disconnected.” Categorizing peoples in this way makes it easier to identify problems, 
prescribe solutions and assess progress quantitatively. Viewed in this light, connectivity 
appears as both the problem and its solution; because “the Connected” are simply “better 
equipped to participate in modern society,”168 expanding this group becomes the main 
objective of “responsible governments.”  
The US‟s position on Internet freedom is premised on the arrogant supposition 
that the US knows what is best for the whole of humanity
169
 and is therefore duty bound 
to save the ill-informed from their own ignorance. Similarly, this logic implicitly suggests 
that conflicting policies concerning ICT are based on knowledge that is “beneath the 
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required level of cognition” and that run counter to the natural course of historical 
progress and are thus “inadequate to their task.”170 Casting itself as the embodiment of 
universal, normative values and claiming responsibility for network governance, the US 
deploys epistemic violence to subjugate and silence alternative discourses and establish 
the terms of the debate over global Internet practices. The assumption underlying  the 
free speech and human rights rhetoric in Clinton‟s speeches, and the Connectivity 
Doctrine in general, is that free markets and Western-style democracy are universally 
good. From this premise, the “problem” becomes how best to spread these values. The 
“solution” is, accordingly, increased connectivity modeled on the US‟s preferred ICT 
architecture. American officials and their allies effectively shut down alternative avenues 
for argumentation; differing viewpoints are not merely cast as misconceived or 
illegitimate, they are categorically dismissed as unworthy of even being considered for 
debate.
171
 
 
6.2 Physical Violence 
Epistemic violence often paves the way for physical violence as states frequently 
cite perceived security concerns or appeal to their preferred version of a Human Rights 
Doctrine to justify foreign interventions. As Foucault explains, the success of the liberal 
project has long depended on strategies that promote certain norms and practices within 
governed populations which accord with the „biological destiny of the species.‟172 Those 
who employ the “historical progress” argument to advance global ICT adoption via the 
Connectivity Doctrine often subscribe to this type of logic. 
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 James Rosenau provides some of the requisite scholarly credibility to this line of 
reasoning, arguing that connectivity is a natural, “evolutionary capacity of humanity” that 
represents the culmination of five million years of a progressive process of learning.
173
  
Employing this logic, those who remain “disconnected” are oftentimes marked as the 
dangerous “other”; their rejection of techno-modernity is interpreted as either ignorance 
or a threat to progress. Thus it becomes the task of the Liberal-Connected to either 
convert the disconnected into believers of the Connectivity Doctrine or force them into 
compliance. If their rejection is due to ignorance, than the disconnected “other” must 
simply “be taught how to be connective.”174 As James Rosenau argues, “connective 
habits and tendencies” must be meticulously constituted in a manner that  “will subject 
[the disconnected] to the lore of connectivity.” 175  The underlying assumption is that 
once they see ICT‟s utility and promise, the disconnected subjects should become 
amenable to connectivity. If they do not, the disconnected must either be coerced into 
transforming or removed, “if necessary with violence, force and war.”176 Regardless of 
the method, “disconnected peoples must be made into connected ones.”177  
As the American military strategist Thomas Barnett opined: “Eradicating 
disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral 
cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will.”178 Defining connectivity as a 
“security task” adds a military dimension to the issue that is not always addressed when 
advocates use human rights rhetoric to advance global ICT proliferation. Like all security 
                                                 
173
 Reid 2009, 609. 
174
 Ibid., 612. 
175
 As quoted in Reid 2009, 612. 
176
 Reid 2009, 612. 
177
 Ibid., 612. 
178
 as quoted in Reid 2009, 614. 
 64 
64 
projects, this security project is a violent one.
179
 And the violence becomes even more 
imminent when the global divide between the “„Functioning Core‟ of connected peoples” 
and the “„Non-integrating Gap‟ of disconnected ones” is advanced as not merely a 
technological disconnect, but as a direct threat to the “correct” way of life and the liberal 
project at large.
180
 The rejection of ICT and the emancipatory Connectivity Doctrine, 
whether by choice or from the lack of material capacities, is understood to be a 
disconnect from the “rules that define the organization of life” and thus “demand[s] 
attention from US military forces.”181  
As such, it is likewise understandable that “the Connected” wage wars almost 
exclusively on the “Disconnected”182 The severity of military action varies according to 
the circumstance, but connectivity is regularly used in one way or another to justify most 
contemporary acts of foreign intervention, and is almost always linked to human rights 
and democracy.
183
 Technological interventions have become increasingly common in the 
last few decades and often serve as a precursor to more aggressive forms of intervention 
or at least set the stage for more physical forms of violence.
184
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With such ties between technology and foreign intervention, it is understandable 
that ICT has rapidly been integrated into a new canon of network-centric warfare. 
Employing handheld computers and communication devices, CGI and satellite mapping 
systems, and computer-guided weaponry, the “Connected” enjoy a far superior military 
elite than the “Disconnected,” at least in terms of technological capabilities. Thus while 
its proponents often praise the emancipatory potential ICT may have, “its emergence has 
been as much tied to the exigencies of demands for improvement in the capacities for 
war-making as it has for new systems of global governance.”185 Indeed, ICT and violence 
often go hand in hand; many of the dominant information and communications 
technologies (most famously the Internet) that are now available for public use were first 
developed for the use of Western militaries. Now, these same militaries are helping 
expand ICTs globally through their role in advancing the Connectivity Doctrine. 
 
6.3 Technological Intervention and Violence 
The US State Department has actively funded the development and promotion of 
Internet censorship circumvention tools since at least 2001, allocating a reported $15 
million to the effort in 2008
186
 and another $28 million in 2011.
187
 These figures may 
seem relatively low for a US governmental line item, but they reflect the minimal cost 
and labor required for this type of foreign intervention. With numerous institutions and 
NGOs willing and able to develop, deploy, and provide training on how to use these 
technologies, coupled with the international approval garnered from the diplomatic 
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capital invested in the UN Human Rights Council and elsewhere, the US is able to 
promote its policies at marginal cost.
188
 Still, while the monetary expense of 
technological intervention may not be substantial, the objectives are far from 
inconsequential. Despite the rhetoric, the US does not act solely out of concern for human 
rights. Rather, its ultimate goal is to transform international political and economic 
systems in a manner more sympathetic to its norms and values. As Daniel McCarthy 
argues, “[t]he desired transformation is a physical one, an attempt to literally build the 
international system in line with the American vision for global politics.”189 
Even with broad international support for this type of technological intervention, 
it should be noted that such policies are not legally sanctioned by international society. 
These efforts are a form of direct intervention into the laws and policies of sovereign 
states, designed specifically to simultaneously assist foreign nationals in breaking their 
home country‟s laws and hinder the ability of foreign governments to enforce them.190 
Moreover, such seemingly “mild” forms of intervention can have serious consequences 
for individuals caught using US financed censorship circumvention technology or 
attending US-sponsored training sessions. 
One striking example of the potentially violent ramifications of technological 
intervention emerged during the demonstrations in Iran following the contentious 
presidential election in 2009. Wanting to help Iranians access websites that were banned 
by the government, Austin Heap, a San Francisco based software developer created an 
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anonymizer
191
 called Haystack that pierced virtual firewalls
192
 while also creating the 
illusion (to any third party monitoring Internet activity) that users were browsing 
innocuous sites (like weather.com or official state media websites).  
 Haystack received overwhelmingly positive coverage from Western media; The 
International Herald Tribune, NPR, Christian Science Monitor, BBC News, among 
others,
193
 cast Austin Heap as a wunderkind in their reports and The Guardian even 
declared him “innovator of the year” in March 2010 for his work.194 Yet Heap received 
these accolades before anyone could verify that the software actually worked. No one 
outside Heap‟s team, including reporters or security professionals, was allowed access to 
Haystack‟s code. When asked to examine the program, Heap simply offered reassurance 
of Haystack‟s functionality and warned that releasing a copy would undermine the 
project‟s security.195 So confidant was Heap in Haystack‟s capabilities that he boasted in 
Newsweek of his plan to export the program to other countries: “We will systematically 
take on each repressive country that censors its people. We have a list. Don't piss off 
hackers who will have their way with you. A mischievous kid will show you how the 
Internet works."
196
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Without independent verification or testing, Heap was simply taken at his word 
and praised for his work. The US State Department went so far as to “fast-track” 
Haystack through the necessary bureaucratic channels to ensure Heap would not be in 
violation of the US trade embargo with Iran. That he received the necessary licenses and 
clearance so quickly suggests that no one at the State Department examined the software 
very closely. Still, the US government‟s endorsement of Haystack (Secretary Clinton 
even mentioned the software by name during an interview), coupled with the positive 
coverage in mainstream (Western) media outlets, gave the software an apparent seal of 
approval that led many to believe that the software worked and could successfully shield 
Iranians from government surveillance.  
The problem is that Haystack did not live up to Heap‟s promises. After just a few 
hours of reviewing a leaked copy of the software‟s code, third-party testers discovered 
enormous problems with the program.
197
 Not only did the program fail to bypass Iran‟s 
firewall, it also left virtual trails containing users‟ GPS coordinates that the Iranian 
government could potentially use to identify anyone who ever used the software, even 
years after the fact.
 198
  
It is unclear how many Iranians used this particular software and very little is 
known of any Haystack-related arrests in Iran.
199
 Still, based on its history of violent 
dealings with anti-government demonstrators, it is not a far stretch to speculate that the 
potential ramifications for Iranian citizens caught using Haystack would have been 
severe. If indeed the Iranian state did use brute force to punish those who used this 
particular software, or technology like it, the US is certainly culpable, if not wholly 
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responsible for the violence. Likewise, the 26 year old software developer, the 
international media, the UN, the numerous countries that supported this type of 
technology, and countless others also share some burden of responsibility. 
As evidenced by its response to the recent pro-democracy demonstrations 
throughout the Middle East, as well as the speeches given by Secretary Clinton, the US is 
showing no signs of curtailing its policy on technological interventions, nor any other 
part of its Internet agenda, despite learning of the Haystack debacle. Quite the contrary, 
the US and other proponents of the Connectivity Doctrine remain committed to the global 
expansion of a “singular,” Western-based model of the Internet at all costs. Thus the 
relevant question for this inquiry becomes, if it has not happened already, how long will 
it be before this readily accepted, “mild” form of intervention results in physically violent 
consequences?  
 
6.4 US Foreign Policy and Violence 
Through her speeches, Secretary Clinton meticulously presents the Connectivity 
Doctrine as a benevolent gift to the world‟s “disconnected” populations. And she 
preemptively defends the policy from attack by situating it within a globally respected 
human rights discourse. Such tactics may be politically savvy, but they also serve to draw 
attention away from the potentially violent repercussions of the Doctrine‟s associated 
actions. Besides the aforementioned epistemic violence and the potentially violent 
punishment for circumventing ICT censorship, violence can also be the consequence of 
inconsistencies in the content and application of foreign policy that has been influenced 
by the Connectivity Doctrine.   
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Over the past few decades, philosophically realist theories of international 
relations have guided much of U.S. foreign policy.  As such, the U.S. has, on occasion, 
supported regimes that they may not agree with ideologically, but that are, nonetheless, of 
strategic importance at a given time. Recent instances, which are especially pertinent to 
the present argument, include supporting authoritarian regimes financially, militarily, and 
in official statements while at the same time providing financial backing and technical 
support to opposition movements. For example, in the years leading up to the 2011 
revolution, Egypt received nearly $1.4 billion annually in military aid from the U.S. (the 
second highest recipient behind Israel) despite its authoritarian government and dismal 
human rights record. At the same time, according to diplomatic cables obtained by 
WikiLeaks,
200
 the U.S. was funneling tens of millions of dollars to pro-democracy 
organizations in the country.
201
 Many members of these oppositional groups were 
subjected to physical violence as a result of their involvement in anti-regime protests, 
violence that was often carried out by Mubarek-led military that was in part funded by 
US aid. The U.S., in effect, helped fund both sides of the conflict. In its official 
statements, however, the Obama administration remained ambiguous; they refused to call 
for President Mubarek‟s resignation and never seriously threatened to take away its 
financial assistance.
202
  
While exalting the emancipatory and democratic promises of ICT, and actively 
funding its global proliferation, the US continues to provide diplomatic, financial, and 
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military support to undemocratic and oppressive regimes. Many of these recipients of US 
aid are amongst the worst in terms of Internet censorship and surveillance and have often 
used violence to punish those caught using ICT to promote democratic movements. To 
cite just a few examples besides Egypt, Vietnam, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, and several others were all labeled “enemies of the Internet” or “under 
surveillance” by Reporters Without Borders,203 yet all received substantial foreign aid 
packages from the US, in many cases funding specifically targeted for military 
purposes.
204
  
Such inconsistencies are obviously not included in official speeches, yet they are 
nonetheless essential in understanding the Connectivity Doctrine. As a political devise, 
the Doctrine may guide policy, when it is convenient to do so, but its application is 
certainly not universal or evenhanded. Despite best intentions, the governments, 
institutions, and corporations that support the Connectivity Doctrine have to measure 
policy decisions in terms of their own self-interest. The techo-optimistic rhetoric that 
claims otherwise is simply misleading and demands serious scrutiny, as the gaps between 
promise and practice share troubling similarities with those created by past imperial 
powers.  
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6.5 Connectivity and Empire 
Marx argues that a social formation (capitalism, communism, neoliberalism, etc.) 
must reproduce the condition of its production to ensure its longevity. In the capitalist 
system, this is accomplished by securing the conditions for capital accumulation through 
the extension of capitalist logic and practices to new territories and commodities.
 205
  In 
the era of early capitalism, imperialism ensured the necessary territorial expansion to 
maintain its preferred social order. In the modern “Information Age,” the Connectivity 
Doctrine is the vehicle of choice with which to secure the conditions of production within 
the new knowledge-based economy.    
Adding to Marx‟s assertion, Louis Althusser contends that “repressive and 
ideological state apparatuses” are deployed in tandem to secure said reproduction of the 
condition of production. These ideological apparatuses (church, school, consumerism, 
etc.) facilitate the movement of capital by instilling the requisite principles and practices 
in the minds of a population, while at the same time demystifying the “gruesome 
consequences of capitalism.”206 The repressive apparatuses (military, police, etc.), in turn, 
work to squelch any dissent that might threaten the state‟s desired ends. States have 
adapted such apparatuses over time in response to changes in socio, political, and 
economic demands. 
Throughout history, imperial powers have continually employed technology and 
manipulated knowledges as part of both of these processes. Doing so has served the dual 
purpose of maintaining order while also allowing for the more efficient exploitation of 
the population‟s labor force. As previously mentioned, in the Information Age, neo-
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liberalism has replaced the imperial state as the dominant hegemonic force. Powerful 
states now work to secure new arenas for capital accumulation and to foster market 
proliferation, rather than territorial expansion. While the goals of modern Empire have 
changed, the means by which they are achieved remain consistent with those of its 
imperial forebearers.  
In the preface to his work on power and modernity, Colonizing Egypt, Timothy 
Mitchell explains that 19
th
 century imperialism involved far more than military 
occupation and economic exploitation. Beyond establishing a ruling presence, 
imperialism as a theoretical concept also refers to “the spread of a political order that 
inscribes in the social world a new conception of space, new forms of personhood, and a 
new means of manufacturing the experience of the real.”207 While Mitchell‟s analysis 
focuses on Egypt, similarities exist between his analysis of British physical and mental 
colonization in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries and the modern “techno-imperialism” that is 
occurring within the virtual space of the Internet. Likewise, parallels can further be drawn 
between knowledge production and colonial “enframing” and the knowledge-ordering 
processes currently taking place by Google and other technology giants. 
Mitchell explains that colonizing forces aimed to “re-order” Egypt as something 
“object-like” so it would appear as a world enframed.208 Egypt had to be reorganized and 
recoded in a manner consistent with a European understanding of order, thus rendering it 
available to political and economic calculation. In other words, “colonial power required 
the country to become readable, like a book, in our own sense of such a term.” 209 The 
result of such micro-level ordering of society was the production of what Mitchell calls 
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the “world-as-exhibition,” in which a strict binary exists between the physical, material 
reality and its representation, which is imbibed with meaning.  
Colonial processes allowed for modern forms of “systematic yet unseen 
surveillance”210 that further isolated and disciplined individuals in order to mold them 
into modern political subjects. These new subjects were to conform to the new European 
conception of personhood as something “set apart from a physical world…as the one who 
observes and controls it…” The “true nature of the human person” was to be industrious, 
self-disciplined, and “objective.” 211 Through surveillance, meticulous data collection, 
and discipline, colonial forces applied European forms of knowledge to the colonized 
populations so that they could come to “know” them. This “knowledge” was then to be 
used to produce and codify a visible hierarchy, which enabled more consistent control 
and efficient exploitation of the population and its labor power.
212
  
The means by which information is ordered on the world wide web is strikingly 
similar to the organizing techniques employed by colonial powers in their efforts to 
restructure occupied lands into readable territories. While she does not explicitly draw 
parallels between past and present imperial projects, Rita Raley does an excellent job of 
explaining the modern “colonization of cyberspace” in her article, “eEmpires.” Raley 
argues that the success of “eEmpire” is the result of the historic amalgamation of 
technology and finance; a partnership that allows “eEmpire” to operate on a global scale 
more efficiently than past forces ever achieved.
213
 This merger has effectively 
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transcended the previous obstacles posed by time and space and has fundamentally 
changed how capital and Empire operate.  
 As a networked operation, the strength of eEmpire lies in its flexibility and 
growth potential; “its value increases as it grows, as [more] knowledge is accumulated, 
more computers are linked to the system, and information processing becomes more 
complex.”214 It does this in part because of the way the original architects of the Internet 
inadvertently constructed the system. Every time someone accesses a Web page, the 
user‟s computer participates in an “incessant dialogue” with other networked machines 
during which it constantly transmits information such as the Internet Protocol (IP) 
address, browser type, user domain, etc.
215
 In this manner, the Internet is able to “code” 
each user and circulate their “reproductions” without their consent or knowledge,216 
which in turn allows for vastly improved methods of “systematic yet unseen 
surveillance,” for use by those with access to this data.  
Differing from past empires that sought to extract raw materials and exploit cheap 
labor from colonized lands, in the modern “information society,” individual users‟ 
personal information is the key exploitable commodity. This information is collected, 
ordered, packaged and sold to marketing firms who in turn produce carefully targeted 
advertisements to users. Such a model, based on the accumulation of virtual information, 
allows global sales and marketing to penetrate geographical boundaries on an 
unprecedented scale. Adding to this, multiple modes of consumption are increasingly 
being synchronized into one platform, so that communication, buying, selling, 
                                                 
214
 Raley, 121-2.  
215
 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics 
(Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 3.  
216
 Ibid., 4.  
 76 
76 
entertainment, etc. all take place on a single computer, smart phone, or tablet, thus 
allowing for progressively more efficient and precise means of data collection.  
Striking as this may sound, such data collection does not necessarily result in a 
virtual, “Big Brother-esque” panopticon on a global scale. Internet “cookies” only code 
certain information, not all web activity. And while a tremendous amount of data is 
collected, the majority is left unanalyzed. Still, the “digital traces” that users leave behind 
produce extremely valuable information that can be coded and sold as a commodity,
217
 
appropriated by governments for surveillance purposes, or used for any number of other 
purposes.  
Eric Schmidt, Chairman and CEO of Google, admits that his ultimate goal is to 
acquire enough detailed personal information about each web user that Google “could 
provide customized answers to the questions „what shall I do tomorrow?‟ and „what job 
shall I take?‟”218 Admittedly, the possibility of instantaneous access to unlimited 
information is as romantic as it is appealing. However, the potential remains for this 
personal information to be used for more nefarious purposes. Furthermore, with such a 
storehouse of data, some information must necessarily remain hidden, neglected, or 
otherwise silenced. A hierarchy of knowledge is literally encoded in the means by which 
information is ordered on the Internet and delivered via search engines. As such, 
regardless of web developers‟ intentions, consolidating information and offering answers 
in this manner demonstrates a contemporary form of epistemic violence. 
Gayatri Spivak warns that knowledge of the Other will ultimately “cohere with 
the work of imperialist subject-constitution, mingling epistemic violence with the 
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advancement of learning and civilization.”219 Google‟s aggressive desire to accumulate 
intimate details about every person on earth and to provide that information freely applies 
directly to this warning. Google‟s algorithm is explicitly programmed to privilege and 
deliver dominant discourses whenever a user enters a search term, thus all material drawn 
from it reinforces the hegemonic power that supports the particular information or 
positions presented. In this manner, the structure of Google and the architecture of the 
Internet in general, serve to silence subordinate ideas and in doing so “consolidate an 
inside” from which to draw profit.220  
This association with epistemic violence is not meant to imply any moral 
judgments concerning the CEO of Google or the company in general; however, there is 
legitimate cause for concern over a corporation that warehouses such a vast collection of 
data about private individuals. Such an arrogant desire to offer individualized answers to 
personal questions submitted to an algorithm-based Internet query will absolutely 
privilege certain epistemes at the expense of others, especially when the company‟s 
ultimate goal is to generate profits. Furthermore, as some of the Google‟s top executives 
enjoy positions alongside some of their counterparts from Facebook and other Internet 
giants as advisors to the President of the United States on ICT policy, it seems imperative 
to scrutinize such close relationships between the world sole remaining superpower and 
the world‟s most powerful repositories and gatekeepers of knowledge.   
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6.6 Selling Empire 
There exists a striking similarity between 19
th
 century imperialism and the 
modern Connectivity Doctrine in the techniques employed to “sell” the two projects to 
the affected populations. Immanuel Wallerstein explains in European Universalism that 
hegemonic powers typically appeal to three primary varieties of universalism for 
justification of their policies: defense of human rights and the spread of democracy; 
western superiority [which is closely tied to posivistic notions of progress and 
modernity]; and the inevitability of market neoliberalism.
221
 As reviewed in the previous 
analysis of Secretary Clinton‟s speeches and US policy, these appeals to universalism are 
repeated continuously in the Connectivity Doctrine to justify the proliferation of the 
hegemonic model of ICT governance. 
The Doctrine‟s active promotion of technology-fostered economic growth 
represents a twenty-first century manifestation of the historically oft-used discourse of 
“progress.” Prominent academics and economists provide the Doctrine with theoretical 
justification and “legitimacy” by asserting that developing countries can “leapfrog” 
industrial production and move directly from an agriculture-based economy to an 
information-based economy by simply adopting the new technology-centric model of 
progress.
222
 It is interesting to note here that the U.S. and other advocates of the 
Connectivity Doctrine embraced this model of development at the very time that 
resistance toward other “modernization” projects223 was gaining momentum.224 While the 
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specifics of the projects may have changed, the overall goals and assumptions remained 
largely the same.  
Appealing to a sense of “Western superiority,” as in the past, modern hegemonic 
power presents itself as the model of progress that others should emulate. In the present 
case, the dominant “nodal powers”225 that promote the Connectivity Doctrine argue that 
the widespread adoption of ICT (again, considered to be politically neutral tools) and 
global adherence to the preferred (Western) structural, operational and governing norms 
are essential for progress. Fittingly, such optimistic faith in the transformative potential of 
ICT tends to mirror the Connectivity Doctrines‟s leading proponents‟ foundational 
assumptions about the power of reason, rationality, and the scientific method to bring 
about predictable and beneficial results. Arguing a similar point about development 
agencies, Rafal Rohozinski argues: “when applied to the role of ICTs, these rational self-
assumptions become even further reified by a pseudo-scientism that considers tools that 
are themselves a product of scientific methods (as ICTs are) to necessarily be carriers of 
rationality.”226 
Understandably, telecommunications companies that stand to profit from the 
widespread adoption of their technologies reaffirm the Connectivity Doctrine‟s basic 
premises.
227
 Yet governments and international institutions also actively promote the 
Connectivity Doctrine without questioning its intrinsic assumptions. The United Nations, 
                                                                                                                                                 
224
 A.J.M Shafiul Alam Bhuiyan, “Peripheral View: Conceptualizing the Information Society as a 
PostColonial Subject,” International Communication Gazette 70 (2008): 104.  
225
 Again, using Manual Castell‟s term stemming from his argument that networks are the basic units of 
modern power and that states, corporations, international political, economic, and financial institutions, 
NGOs, etc. are all nodes within larger power networks. See Castells, The Network Society.   
226
 Rafal Rohozinski, “Bullets to Bytes: Reflections on ICTs and „Local‟ Conflict,” in Bombs and 
Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship Between Information Technology and Security, (New York: 
The New Press, 2003), 219. 
227
 Chun 2006, 147. 
 80 
80 
the WTO, the IMF and many NGOs and academics tacitly accept the underlying neo-
liberal logic and look for ways to foster economic growth by adopting the framework of 
the knowledge-based economy. Several UN reports even repeat the Doctrine‟s language, 
urging developing nations to “catch the Internet Express” and argue that doing so is their 
“best hope…for integrating into the global economy.”228 Recommendations and 
development projects endorsed by the UN and other international political and economic 
organizations strongly encourage global integration into the new knowledge-based 
economy and implicitly support everything that comes with it, including strict intellectual 
property laws, privatizing state-owned telecommunications networks, offering incentives 
to and protecting new markets in ICT, etc. Promoting the Doctrine further, in 2000, UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan urged governments of developing countries to “nurture 
and support” the private sector by providing institutional support, offering tax incentives, 
and other measures. Such “other measures” of support include selling off domestic 
telecommunication networks to foreign corporations, as was done by Estonia in the 
1990s, a country that the UN lists as a model of successful integration into the global 
knowledge-based economy.
229
 
The Connectivity Doctrine helps illustrate the way power operates in the modern 
networked society. Foucault argues that modern power must be analyzed as “something 
that circulates…[because] Power is exercised through networks…[and] passes through 
individuals. It is not applied to them.”230 Similarly, Empire works through individuals by 
their own participation within said networks. Modern Empire, operating through 
networks and facilitated by the Internet, does not seek to extend its fixed, territorial 
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boundary but rather to “incorporate the entire global realm within its open, expanding 
frontiers.”231  
Such rapid and expansive incorporation can be detrimental to an individual‟s 
understanding of identity. As states no longer serve as the singular “locus of power,” 
they, consequently, no longer provide an adequate mythology that can bind a diverse 
population.
232
 This failure is inconsequential for modern Empire, which is not interested 
in preserving past unities that present potential barriers to capital expansion. Instead, 
individuals linked to the networks forge new “hybrid identities” that are no longer rigidly 
defined by a First World – Third World split, but rather, “a body so fragmented that its 
morphology is a diaspora.”233  Nodal centers (such as global media conglomerates, 
transnational corporations, and the ICT industry) battle for control of the “dominant 
cultural memory” by “develop[ing] competing archives to store and produce the „truth‟ or 
a dominant cultural memory.”234 Individuals engage with these networks constantly yet 
remain “unconscious of the mechanisms that structure the [position] in which they find 
themselves;”235 they remain “focused on the content [of networks], not on their mechanic 
or formal qualities.”236  
Wendy Hui Kyong Chun provides an analysis of one company‟s attempt to 
(literally) “sell” modern ICT using the Connectivity Doctrine‟s guiding logic, and its 
effect on individual identity, in her work on modern forms of power in the Information 
Age. In the mid to late 1990s, when the Internet was still a novel technology for most 
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people, private Internet service providers spent millions in advertising campaigns aimed 
at convincing consumers to become connected. During this time, telecommunications 
giant MCI ran a now-infamous commercial titled “Anthem” that presented the Internet as 
a virtual, utopian realm of endless possibility, free from "real world" inequities like race, 
class, gender, age, illness, etc. The advertisement features people of various races, 
genders, ages and with physical challenges who recite the following script: 
 
People can communicate mind-to-mind 
Not black-to-white. 
There is no race. 
There are no genders. 
  Not man-to-woman 
There is no age. 
  Not young-to-old 
No age. 
There are no infirmities. 
  Not short-to-tall. 
Just thought-to-thought. Idea-to-idea. 
There are only minds. 
What is this place?  
Utopia?  
No. 
The Internet, 
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Where minds, doors and lives open up. 
  Nice place, this place called the Internet. 
Is this a great time, or what?
237
 
 
While the advertisement states that the Internet is not utopia, the overriding sentiment 
implies it is like utopia. The commercial presents a virtual world that is seemingly 
superior to the “real world;” a world devoid of inequality where the normative merits of 
Enlightenment philosophy prevail. It insinuates that users can “resist objectification 
(become emancipated) by becoming text online.”238 While users suffer from inequality in 
the real world, the users‟ textual, virtual self-representations allow them to feel 
empowered in their ability to “pass as the (fictional) unmarked white male” and “buy 
oneself back into the realm of rational-critical debate,  [the realm] which is now redefined 
as the marketplace of ideas.”239 Marketing the myth that Internet users are all regarded as 
equal and (race, class, gender) neutral “minds” in cyberspace depoliticizes the individual; 
rather than addressing political, economic and social inequality, ISPs claim to simply 
offer a place where they do not exist. The unspoken argument thus becomes: with such an 
incredible opportunity, why would anyone NOT want to become part of the Connected?  
 Marketing the Internet in this way was extremely successful
240
 as the number of 
US Internet users doubled from 1997 to 1998.
241
 While seemingly obvious, it is important 
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to note that MCI was a private corporation selling a product for profit, it was not an 
altruistic organization seeking to erase inequality and empower human beings, despite 
what the ads might imply. MCI and other telecommunications firms actively exploited 
and fostered a growing historical amnesia by implicitly asking users to disregard the real 
discrimination they faced. Telecommunications corporations were in effect privatizing 
civil rights and offering consumers the “rights” and “freedoms” that states had failed to 
honor and protect for them as citizens.
242
  
Ironically, the same year the MCI ad ran, a U.S. government report revealed that 
the digital divide between white and minority households remained enormous. Yet rather 
than hurting business, telecommunications companies were able to exploit these statistics 
by asserting that the only solution to the disparity between “potential and actual 
empowerment” via technology was for more users to purchase their products and 
services. They effectively gave themselves an “unending mandate” by defining 
“technologically produced…equality as the ideal,” which could only be reached on a 
global scale only by increased adoption of their technology.
243
  
While the Internet no longer needs to be “sold” to consumers as it did in the 
1990s, ICT corporations continue to market the Internet as a utopian realm devoid of the 
problems and inequities faced in the “real world.” In 2011, Google ran a television 
commercial featuring the pop star Lady Gaga as part of the marketing campaign 
promoting its web browser, Chrome. The commercial alternates between images of the 
singer running through New York City and videos that Lady Gaga fans have posted on 
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YouTube (a subsidiary of Google) of them singing along with and dancing to her music. 
In the background, Lady Gaga‟s song “Edge of Glory” proclaims “there a‟int no reason 
you and I should be alone…I‟m on the edge of glory, and I‟m hanging on a moment with 
you.” The singer is then seen typing a message to her fans, telling them that they are all 
“superstars” and that they inspire her.  Lady Gaga concludes her message with a brief, yet 
comforting sentiment: “This is our moment…Stay strong…” As the image fades, 
Chrome‟s tagline appears on the screen: “the web is what you make of it.”244 
The ad confronts a sense of isolation and loneliness that is common amongst Lady 
Gaga fans, or “little monsters,” as she adoringly calls them.245 Google presents the 
audience with a “virtual” community where everyone is welcome and where celebrity 
and fan stand as equals; fans can both be inspired by and inspire their pop heroes and pop 
stars can communicate directly with their audience. The music serves as an object of 
commonality that brings together people from all walks of life; the Internet serves as the 
vehicle that allows this to happen.  
Twenty years after MCI ran the “Anthem” commercial, private companies are still 
trying to package and sell the Internet as a utopian sphere, apart from the “real word.” 
Like the MCI ad, the Chrome commercial presents a world of equality, freedom, and 
endless possibility assessable solely through the use of ICT, particularly in this case, 
Google products. In this way, telecommunications corporations have helped define, and 
continue to shape, the parameters of debates concerning ICT and cyberspace. In 
                                                 
244
 “Google Chrome: Lady Gaga,” YouTube video of television commercial, posted by “googlechrome” on 
May 20, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDPJ-o1leAw (accessed May 10, 2012). 
245
 Lady Gaga has become a pop-culture hero for many people who do not conform to the prevailing 
societal norms of behavior. She is especially popular in the LGBTQ community for her acceptance of 
non-traditional lifestyles (although her status as a “gay icon” is not without criticism), most prominently 
displayed in the song “Born this Way. 
 86 
86 
advancing the Connectivity Doctrine, governmental bodies, NGOs, and private 
companies present “cyberspace” as an existing, utopian realm, an improved alternative to 
the “real world.” In so doing, they effectively depoliticize individual agency and existing 
inequalities; users need not spend time negotiating identity or fighting for justice, for the 
Connected are all equal in the network.  
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Chapter VII: Conclusion  
The purpose of this analysis is not to argue for or against global ICT proliferation, 
nor is it to measure the merits of unfettered access to information against the sovereign 
right to determine what content should or should not be made available for public 
consumption. Rather, the purpose of this inquiry is to illustrate how epistemic violence 
often renders such debate irrelevant. Through calculated rhetoric and strategic framing of 
policy, the creative navigation of diplomatic channels, and by taking advantage of 
influential positions in global institutions and governing bodies, proponents of the 
Connectivity Doctrine have advanced a one-size-fits-all vision of the Internet as just, 
moral, and progressive. In so doing, they have effectively sidelined debates concerning 
the contingent history, optimal architecture, and present and future governance structure 
of information and communication technology.
246
 Through the Connectivity Doctrine, 
proponents have advanced a Western understanding of individual rights and liberal 
sovereignty as superior to notions of cultural or communal rights. Likewise, Western (or 
in this case, distinctly U.S.) definitions of free speech and intellectual property rights are 
presented as universal rights and norms that trump a state‟s right to determine what is 
best for its own security and economic well being.    
This paper serves as a contribution to what I feel is an all too often neglected, yet 
incredibly important aspect of ICT analyses. While I agree with Robert McChesney‟s 
contention that modern ICT present “an unprecedented opportunity…to build a 
communication system that will be a powerful impetus to a dramatically more egalitarian, 
humane, sustainable, and creative society,”247 I believe that such a system can only 
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succeed if it is built on a solid foundation that embraces and fosters these end goals. If a 
new global communication system is quickly forced into the existing framework without 
the necessary debate and planning simply to replace the old, it risks becoming nothing 
more than “Status Quo 2.0.” If the end goals of the Connectivity Doctrine are truly 
freedom of speech, universal access to information, and democratic debate and dialogue 
(as the rhetoric suggests), than these principles must guide the entire process.  
I fear this “unprecedented opportunity” could be squandered if policy makers, and 
those who influence them, become too enamored by the easy answers and romantic 
promises of the Connectivity Doctrine. The Connectivity Doctrine‟s leading proponents 
are Western governments, institutions, and corporations, who are all driven by motives 
beyond human rights and free speech. By forcibly inserting neoliberal values into the 
policies that shape the global ICT infrastructure (for example, promoting the privatization 
of ICT-related companies and the deregulation of the ICT industry), the Doctrine‟s 
advocates appear disingenuous; the policy simply does not match the rhetoric. The 
prevailing models and policies concerning ICT architecture and governance are all well 
suited for expanding neoliberalism abroad, but the same cannot be said for promoting 
free speech and universal access to information.   
This disconnect between the purported goals and benefits of the Connectivity 
Doctrine and its actual implementation illustrates the need for further scrutiny of existing 
and future policies that effect global ICT. Whether or not the Connectivity Doctrine 
represents a modern form of virtual imperialism or not, serious consideration should be 
given to the costs and benefits associated with applying policies that have such profound 
implications. In the present case, the question must be asked: would the universal 
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application of the Connectivity Doctrine (a singular, Western model of ICT adoption and 
governance) do more harm than good to the people it is supposed to help?   
Such an inquiry is extremely important and the answer has broad reaching and 
long lasting consequences. Still, this topic is rarely addressed as such. Contemporary 
debates in academia and international governing bodies about ICT and cyberspace are 
concerned primarily with issues such as how to diminish the digital divide, how to protect 
sensitive users from explicit material, how to prevent identity theft, how to combat online 
piracy and protect intellectual property, etc. The Internet‟s architecture, organizational 
structure, and governance are not debated nearly as much and are often assumed to be 
fixed, neutral, or secondary concerns. As such, ICT debates are almost always premised 
on the Connectivity Doctrine‟s broad assumptions: that a singular Internet exists; that the 
dominant Internet structure and governing norms are universally applicable; and that 
increased access to this specific version of the Internet is universally beneficial. 
Ultimately, my personal opinion is that the Internet‟s architecture should reflect 
the 1990s notion of the “information super highway,” and its content should be free and 
accessible to all. Because information and communication is such a vital and fundamental 
component of any functioning democracy, and because digital infrastructures are 
relatively inexpensive to build and maintain, it seems reasonable that the Internet should 
be universally available, free of charge, as a public service. Obviously this would require 
substantial planning and costs initially in terms of infrastructure construction, education, 
and other logistical demands, but this is no different than the publicly funded highway 
system or the National Parks in terms of long-term costs and benefits. This is not to say 
that the government should provide every citizen with a computer or any other device 
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with which to connect to the Internet (although I would argue for increased access points 
via libraries and other public institutions), but access to the World Wide Web should be 
free and readily available; it should not be guarded and administered by private 
corporations whose actions are unabashedly guided by profits over people.  
In terms of content, I think the Internet should resemble a public library, where 
people are not charged for access, but are instead provided information and resources free 
of charge, regardless of race, class, or social status. The fundamental differences between 
physical commodities and digital productions demand a reexamination of the existing 
intellectual property laws. Likewise, the conveniently ambiguous approval of 
“legitimate” censorship in the name of security, which I believe should be categorically 
dismissed as an abuse of state power, merits substantial public debate. 
While I strongly believe in a truly free and open Internet, I recognize that my 
opinion is absolutely influenced by my residence within the United States and my 
association with a Western, private, liberal arts university. Using the same logic that I 
employ in this thesis to question the legitimacy of the US and its allies to prescribe the 
global adoption of the Connectivity Doctrine, I admit that I am in no way qualified to 
suggest an alternative ICT policy that is universally appropriate. ICT policy should be 
crafted in a manner that respects religious and cultural values as well as political and 
economic needs. It should not be used as a “carrot” or a “stick” to influence or punish 
those with political and economic systems that differ from the hegemonic model. Such a 
task will certainly be difficult and will require extensive debate and cooperation on a 
global scale. Still, it is essential that policy makers put forth the necessary time, energy, 
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and resources if we are ever to enjoy a communication system that will indeed foster a 
“dramatically more egalitarian, humane, sustainable, and creative society,”248 
 
                                                 
248
 McChesney 2007, xiii. 
 92 
92 
Bibliography 
 
Barlow, John Perry. “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” 8 February  
1996, https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. Accessed 23  
February 2012. 
 
Barnett, Thomas P.M. Great Powers: America and the World After Bush. New York:  
Putnam, 2009. 
 
Bhuiyan, A.J.M Shafiul Alam. “Peripheral View: Conceptualizing the Information  
Society as a PostColonial Subject.” International Communication Gazette 70  
(2008): 99-116.  
 
Brockling, Ulrich, Susanne Krasmann, and Thomas Lemke, eds. Governmentality:  
Current Issues and Future Challenges. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
 
“Bush Doctrine.” Chambers Dictionary of World History. London: Chambers Harrap,  
2005. Credo Reference. Accessed 2 May 2012. 
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy2.lib.depaul.edu/entry/chambdictwh/bush 
_doctrine. 
 
“Bush Doctrine.” Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations. Santa Barbara:  
ABC-CLIO, 2002. Credo Reference. Accessed 2 May 2012.  
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy2.lib.depaul.edu/entry/abcintrel/bush_doc 
trine_2001. 
 
Carr, Nicholas. The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains. New York: W.  
W. Norton & Company, 2010.  
 
Castells, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society. Malden, Ma: Polity Press, 2000. 
 
Castells, Manuel. Communication Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Chun, Wendy Hui Kyong. Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of  
Fiber Optics. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2006. 
 
Clinton, Hillary. “Remarks on Internet Freedom.” Speech at The Newseum, Washington  
D.C., 21 January 2010. Transcript available at  
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (accessed 2 April 2012). 
Clinton, Hillary. “Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked  
World.” Speech at George Washington University, Washington D.C., 15 February  
2011. Transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm (accessed 2 April 2012). 
 
Dean, Jodi. Blog Theory: Feedback and Capture in the Circuits of Drive. Malden, MA:  
Polity Press, 2010.  
 93 
93 
 
Dean, Mitchell. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: SAGE  
Publications Ltd, 2010. 
 
Deibert, Ronald and Rafal Rohozinski. “Liberation VS. Control: The Future of  
 Cyberspace.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 21, Number 4 (October 2010): 43 – 57. 
 
Diamond, Larry. “Liberation Technology.” Journal of Democracy Vol. 21, Number 3  
(July 2010): 69-83. 
 
Dobson, William J. “Needles in a Haystack,” Newsweek, August 6, 2010. Accessed 15  
April 2011. http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/06/needles-in-a-
haystack.print.html  
 
Executive Office of the President and the National Security Council (U.S.). International  
Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked  
World. May 16, 2011.  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_f 
or_cyberspace.pdf. Accessed 21 May 2012. 
 
Foster, John Bellamy and Robert W. McChesney. “The Internet‟s Unholy Marriage to  
Capitalism.” Monthly Review, (March 2011): 1-30.  
 
Foucault, Michel. “Truth and Power.” In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and  
Other Writings 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon, 109-33. New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1980.  
 
Foucault, Michel, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. The Foucault  
Effect: Studies in Governmentality: with Two Lectures by and an Interview with  
Michel Foucault. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
 
Gaouette, Nicole, and Brendan Greely. “U.S. Funds help Democracy Activists Evade  
Internet Crackdowns.” Bloomberg News, April 19, 2011. Accessed 21 April 2012. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-20/u-s-funds-help-democracy-
 activists-evade-internet-crackdowns.html. 
 
Golkar, Saeid. “Liberation or Suppression Technologies? The Internet, the Green  
Movement and the Regime in Iran.” International Journal of Emerging  
Technologies and Society ol. 9, no.1 (2011): 50-70. 
 
“Google Chrome: Lady Gaga.” YouTube video of television commercial. Posted by 
“googlechrome” on May 20, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDPJ-
o1leAw 
 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press,  
2000.  
 
 94 
94 
Hassan, Robert. The Information Society: Cyber Dreams and Digital Nightmares.  
Malden, Ma: Polity Press, 2008.  
 
Hindman, Matthew. The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University  
Press, 2009. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric. On Empire: America, War, and Global Supremacy. New York: The  
New Press, 2008.   
 
Internet World Stats. “Internet Growth Statistics.” Accessed 18 February 2012.  
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm 
 
Katz, Jon. “The Digital Citizen.” Wired 5.2 (December 1997). Accessed January 29,  
2012. http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.12/netizen_pr.html 
 
Krotoski, Aleks. “MediaGuardian Innovation Awards: Austin Heap V Iran‟s Censors.”  
The Guardian, 28 March 2010. Accessed 2 April 2012.   
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/mar/29/austin-heap-megas-innovator-
award. 
 
Lemke, Thomas. Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique. Boulder, Co: Paradigm  
Publishers, 2011. 
 
Lemke, Thomas. Bio-Politics: An Advanced Introduction. New York: New York  
University Press, 2011.  
 
Lemke, Thomas. “The birth of bio-politics‟: Michel Foucault‟s lecture at the College de  
France on neo-liberal governmentality,” Economy and Society Volume 30 number  
2 (May 2001): 190-207.  
 
Li, Tania Murray. The Will to Improve. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007. 
 
Lynn III, William J. "Defending a New Domain." Foreign Affairs 89, no. 5 (September  
2010): 97-108.  
 
MacKinnon, Rebecca. Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet  
Freedom. New York: Basic Books, 2012. 
 
Manjikian, Mary McEvoy. “From Global Village to Virtual Battlespace: The  
Colonization of the Internet and the Extension of Realpolitik.” International  
Studies Quarterly 54 (2010): 381-401. 
 
Markwick, Michael. “The Unlawful Freedom of Communication.” Oxford Internet  
Institute, September 2010. Accessed May 20, 2012.  
http://microsites.oii.ox.ac.uk/ipp2010/system/files/IPP2010_Markwick_Paper.pdf 
 
 95 
95 
Marlin-Bennett, Renee. “I Hear America Tweeting and Other Themes for a Virtual Polis:  
Rethinking Democracy in the Global InfoTech Age.” Journal of Information  
Technology & Politics 8 (2011): 129-145. 
 
McCarthy, Daniel R. “Open Networks and the Open Door: American Foreign Policy and  
the Narration of the Internet.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (2011): 89-111. 
 
McChesney, Robert. Communication Revolution: Critical Junctures and the Future of  
Media. New York: The New Press, 2007. 
 
MCI. “Anthem.” Commercial video clip. Accessed 21 April 2012. Critical Commons.  
http://criticalcommons.org/Members/JLipshin/clips/Anthem.mp4/view.  
 
MCI. “Anthem.” Commercial video clip. Accessed 21 April 2012.  
http://vimeo.com/2445340.  
 
Middle East Online. “Cables: US funded Egyptian pro-democracy movement.” 28  
January 2011. Accessed 2 February 2012. http://www.middle-east-
online.com/english/?id=43952. 
 
Mitchell, Timothy. Colonizing Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.  
 
“Monroe Doctrine.” The Columbia Encyclopedia. New York: Columbia University Press,  
2008. Credo Reference. Accessed 2 May 2012.  
http://www.credoreference.com.ezproxy1.lib.depaul.edu/entry/columency/monroe
_doctrine.  
 
Morozov, Evgeny. “The Great Internet Freedom Fraud: How Haystack Endangered the  
Iranian Dissidents it was Supposed to Protect.” Slate, September 26, 2010.  
Accessed 30 March 2011. http://www.slate.com/id/2267262. 
 
Morozov, Evgeny. The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom. New York:  
Public Affairs, 2011. 
 
Murray, Tania. The Will to Improve. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007.  
 
Nadesan, Majia Holmer. Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life. New York:  
Routledge, 2008. 
 
Nealon, Jeffrey T. Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications Since 1984.  
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.  
 
Norris, John. “Interactive Map: Foreign Aid Analysis Made Easy.” Center for American  
Progress. February 7, 2011. Accessed May 12, 2012.  
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/foreignaid.html. 
 
Pariser, Eli. The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding From You. New York: The  
 96 
96 
Penguin Press, 2011.  
 
Penenberg, Adam L. “The Evolution of Amazon.” Fast Company 137 (July/August  
2009): 66-74. 
 
Poster, Mark. “The Information Empire.” Comparative Literature Studies Vol. 41, No. 3  
(2004): 317-334. 
 
Poster, Mark. “Postcolonial Theory in the Age of Planetary Communications.”  
Quarterly Review of Film and Video 24 (2007): 379-393.  
 
Postigo, Hector. “Questioning the Web 2.0 Discourse: Social Roles, Production, Values,  
and the Case of the Human Rights Portal.” The Information Society 27 (2011):  
181-193.  
 
Raley, Rita. “eEmpires.” Cultural Critique 57 (Spring 2004): 111-150.  
 
Reid, Julian. “Politicizing Connectivity: Beyond the Biopolitcs of Information  
Technology in International Relations.” Cambridge Review of International  
Affairs 22, no. 4 (December 2009): 607-623. 
 
Reporters Without Borders, Enemies of the Internet Report 2012. 12 March 2012.  
Accessed May 15, 2012. http://en.rsf.org/beset-by-online-surveillance-and-13-03- 
2012,42061.html. 
 
Rohozinski, Rafal. “Bullets to Bytes: Reflections on ICTs and „Local‟ Conflict.” In  
Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship Between Information  
Technology and Security, edited by Robert Latham, 215-234. New York: The  
New Press, 2003. 
 
Scobey, Margaret. “President Mubarak‟s Visit to Washington.” 19 May 2009.  
WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks cable: 09CAIRO874. Accessed May 25, 2012. 
 http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/05/09CAIRO874.html# 
 
Shirky, Clay. “The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and  
Political Change.” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2011): 28-41. 
 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Can the Subaltern Speak.” In Marxism and the  
Interpretation of Culture. ed. Nelson and Grossber. Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 1998, 271-313. 
 
Stross, Randall. Planet Google: One Company’s Audacious Plan to Organize  
Everything we Know. New York: Free Press, 2008. 
 
“Timeline: The Changing U.S. Reaction to Egypt‟s Crisis.” AlertNet. Last Modified  
February 11, 2011. Accessed May 25, 2012.  
 97 
97 
http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/timeline-the-changing-us-reaction-to-egypts- 
crisis/. 
 
Turkle, Sherry. Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology and Less From  
Each Other. New York: Basic Books, 2011. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power. New York: The 
 New Press, 2006. 
 
Watts, Michael. “Development and Governmentality.” Singapore Journal of Tropical 
Geography 24 (2003): 6-34. 
 
Zureik, Elia, L. Lynda Harling Stalker, and Emily Smith. Surveillance, Privacy, and the  
Globalization of Personal Information: International Comparisons. Montreal:  
McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 2010. 
 
Zysman, John, and Abraham Newman, eds. How Revolutionary Was the Digital  
Revolution? National Responses, Market Transitions, and Global Technology.  
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.  
 
 
 
 
